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ABSTRACT 
 
How the mind builds evolutionarily new concepts 
 
by 
 
Michael Barlev 
 
The human mind is equipped with a variety of evolved mechanisms, each specialized 
for representing concepts from an adaptively important domain, such as persons and their 
mental states, animals and their biology, plants, and physical objects and their mechanical 
properties. But how does the mind build concepts that were not targets of natural selection, 
that is, concepts that go beyond or even conflict with the inferences engineered into these 
evolved mechanisms? Are evolutionarily new concepts built out of nothing (as domain-
general learning theories predict), or are they built by initially co-opting evolved concepts? 
And if evolutionary new concepts initially co-opt evolved ones, do they later revise the 
evolved concepts, or do they co-exist alongside them? I evaluate these questions using the 
Christian God concept as a case study. 
I demonstrate using a novel sentence verification paradigm that, first, the God 
concept is built by co-opting the evolved person concept, and, second, that in the minds of 
Christian religious adherents, acquired theological representations of God which conflict 
with person representations (e.g. infallibility) co-exist alongside and do not revise them. In 
the experiments reported here, Christian religious adherents were asked to evaluate 
xiii 
 
statements for which core knowledge intuitions about persons and acquired Christian 
theology about God were consistent (i.e., true according to both [e.g., “God has beliefs that 
are true”] or false according to both [e.g., “All beliefs God has are false”]) or inconsistent 
(i.e., true on intuition but false theologically [e.g., “God has beliefs that are false”] or false on 
intuition but true theologically [e.g., “All beliefs God has are true”]). Exp. 1 demonstrated 
that participants were less accurate and slower responding to inconsistent versus consistent 
statements, suggesting that the core knowledge intuitions both co-existed alongside and 
interfered with the acquired theological representations. Exp. 2 tested the effects of cognitive 
load on response interference. Exp. 3 ruled out a plausible alternative interpretation of these 
findings, by demonstrating that response interference is found for God but not for an ordinary 
entity (a priest). Exp. 4 demonstrated that response interference is invariant with age and with 
theological experience. Indeed, response interference was found even in Christian religious 
adherents with a lifetime of theological experience. Finally, Exp. 5-6 expanded on the 
findings of the previous experiments, which primarily focused on God’s psychology, to 
God’s physicality. I discuss the implications of these findings to domain-general versus 
domain-specific theories of learning. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction to how the mind builds evolutionarily new concepts 
 
The way we see the world, and the reason why we find some things intuitively easy to grasp and others  
hard, is that our brains are themselves evolved organs: on-board computers, evolved to help us survive in a 
world - I shall use the name Middle World - where the objects that mattered to our survival were neither very 
large nor very small; a world where things either stood still or moved slowly compared with the speed of light; 
and where the very improbable could safely be treated as impossible. (Dawkins, 2006, p. 412) 
 
Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited. It will not 
help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn 
catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system 
of reflected high-frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an 
attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to 
behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I 
try to imagine this, I am restricted to the resources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the 
task. I cannot perform it either by imagining additions to my present experience, or by imagining segments 
gradually subtracted from it, or by imagining some combination of additions, subtractions, and modifications. 
(Nagel, 1974, p. 439). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nagel (1974) argues that organisms have a “subjective character of experience”, that 
is, an experience of what it is like for that organism to be that organism. The problem, he 
argues, is that one organism cannot know what it is like for another organism to be that 
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organism. That is, the answer to the question he advances – “what is it like to be a bat?” – is 
intractable to a human: while we can imagine which of our experiences are most like those of 
a bat, we cannot know what the experience of being a bat is like for a bat.1 
In the spirit of Nagel’s example, consider what it might be like to be a viper. The 
sensory systems of different animals are engineered to solve the adaptive problem of 
spatially representing the environment around them. In humans and in phylogenetically 
related animals like chimpanzees, this problem is partially solved by chemical reactions in 
proteins within photoreceptor cells in the retina transduce electromagnetic radiation of a 
range of wavelengths to neural signals. In other animals, though, natural selection has 
engineered a very different solution: some families of snakes (vipers, pythons, and boas) 
have specialized facial structures called pit organs, which contain a heat-sensitive membrane. 
The pit organ collects heat from infrared radiation, and the membrane transduces this heat 
energy into neural signals (Gracheva et al., 2010). Although infrared sensation in snakes is 
often discussed as a component of snake vision, the pit organ receives direct input from the 
somatosensory system, not the visual system (Gracheva et al., 2010). Further, the mechanism 
by which heat energy is transduced (thermotransduction) is dissimilar to the photochemical 
transduction of electromagnetic radiation in humans (Gracheva et al., 2010), and, 
parenthetically, the receptor doing so (TRPA1) is involved in nociception, not vision, in 
humans (that is, in humans it detects chemical irritants; e.g. Caterina et al., 1997). While 
infrared and visual perceptions may be integrated in the snake’s brain, we do not know the 
extent to which this infrared sensation in snakes is analogous to human vision. 
                                                 
1 The experience of any two humans, in contrast, is similar enough so that, with relatively high 
precision, we can simulate what the experience of another human is like; intersectionality and the hesitation that 
can be read in Nagel (1974) notwithstanding, the question “what is it like to be a (/ another) human?” is not 
intractable. 
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Nowadays, humans can “see” infrared radiation using technology which either detects 
and amplifies low amounts of light, or detects emitted heat. But it is not at all clear that this 
technology allows us to see like snakes see, only to use the same infrared information snakes 
use to spatially represent the environment around us (the human brain can only represent 
infrared radiation via the somatosensory system as heat) – infrared radiation still needs to be 
mechanically converted to formats the human visual system can represent.2 Our best and in 
fact only possible estimation of how snakes experience the world, then, is through 
information-processing systems that already exist in our brain. The same basic principle 
applies to the extraordinary color vision of the mantis shrimp (which has twelve types of 
photoreceptors in contrast to three types in humans), echolocation in toothed whales (e.g. 
dolphins and orcas) and many species of bats, and so on.  
Thus, what is it like to be a viper, or a bat? As Nagel (1974) puts it, the best that we 
can do is to use those of our experiences that we imagine to be most like those of a bat, 
experiences that are the outputs of information-processing systems that already exist in our 
brains, and bend those experiences as far as they will go as we try to comprehend the answer 
to this question. 
A parallel puzzle concerns not experience but concepts or bundles of information: 
how does our mind come to represent concepts that are outside of the conceptual repertoire 
of Middle World (Dawkins, 2006) – things that are very small or very large, like subatomic 
particles or the universe, processes that are very slow or very fast (e.g. geological and 
evolutionary processes), and extraordinary beings like the omniscient, omnipotent, 
                                                 
2 Incidentally, a failure to recognize this is a weakness of many embodied cognition positions, 
particularly extended cognition (e.g. Andy Clark). 
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omnipresent, and incorporeal Christian God. We may again not be able to do better than to 
bend already existing concepts. But this is an empirical question, and the topic of this 
dissertation. But before that, a few preliminaries.  
The past few decades of research in cognitive development have revolutionized our 
most basic theories about the ontogeny of concepts, which Carey (2009) defines as abstract 
mental representations not specifiable from sensori-motor information. Examples include the 
representation of depth (Gibson & Walk, 1960), and the representation of causality (for 
adults see Michotte, 1963, and for 6-month-old infants see Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Classic 
empiricist theories assume little to no innate mental content, with new concepts acquired 
through sensori-motor experience and domain-general learning processes (e.g. Piaget, 1954). 
However, this “blank slate” view has been challenged by modern nativist (also termed 
rationalist) theories which assume that the mind includes innate concepts and domain-
specialized learning mechanisms (Carey, 2009, terms these “innate perceptual input 
analyzers”), that scaffold conceptual development. 
The nativist view of conceptual development is closely allied in its battle against 
empiricism with an evolutionary view of psychology (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994) according 
to which the human conceptual repertoire was designed by natural selection to represent 
fitness-relevant properties of the environments in which humans evolved. The evolutionarily 
psychological view proposes that the brain is a behavior-regulating machine made out of 
neural circuits or “modules.” These modules were designed by natural selection to solve 
adaptive problems, defined as those cross-generationally recurrent problems the solution of 
which increased fitness (survival and reproduction). A fundamental insight of this view is 
that our brains do not form veridical representations of the world. As Boyer (2015, p. 185) 
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put it, they do not “carve nature at its joints” as is often assumed, because nature does not 
have joints that are equally relevant to organisms of different species. Rather, our brains form 
representations that were relevant for the survival and reproduction of our ancestors (Tooby, 
Cosmides, & Barrett, 2005; Boyer, 2015). Furthermore, the adaptive problems our modules 
solve are those that existed in ancestral environments (i.e. those environments in which those 
modules evolved) and may or may not exist nowadays. 
Because our brains form representations relevant for survival and reproduction, some 
features of the world that are irrelevant for survival and reproduction are not represented. For 
example, while we predict the downward motion of unsupported objects, we do not represent 
the concept of “gravity”. As Cosmides and Tooby (1994) put it, we are blind to the existence 
of this and other instincts. Moreover, because we are blind to the existence of this instinct 
that unsupported objects fall, we are blind to the fact that gravity is a thing in nature to be 
explained (nature could be otherwise, e.g., unsupported objects could remain stationary in 
midair). 
However, the starting point of empiricist investigations, and a fact which must be 
taken seriously by an evolutionary theory of human psychology, is that in addition to our 
reliably developing conceptual repertoire we are able to learn concepts that are radically 
different from those of Middle World: subatomic particles, the universe, geological and 
evolutionary processes, or extraordinary beings. Thus, under a nativist or an evolutionary 
psychological theory, how do we do this? 
As I noted above, the brain consists of evolved adaptations – mental mechanisms 
designed by natural selection to solve ancestral fitness-relevant problems. Critically, these 
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mechanisms can be co-opted to serve functions for which they were not designed.3 Sperber 
and Hirschfeld (2004) advance the useful distinction between the proper and actual domains 
of a mechanism, the proper domain being the narrower set of stimuli the mechanism evolved 
to process, and the actual domain being the broader set of stimuli it can process. For 
example, mechanisms for verbal language comprehension are co-opted to solve the 
evolutionarily novel problem of written language comprehension (Pinker, 1994). Spoken 
words are in the proper domain of language comprehension mechanisms, while spoken as 
well as written words are in their actual domain. Similarly, evolved concepts or bundles of 
information may be co-opted for representing things which they were not designed to 
represent. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate how humans build evolutionarily new 
concepts, that is, concepts that were not targets of natural selection, by investigating in detail 
two related phenomena: representation co-options, already mentioned above, and 
representation co-existence. The latter is a phenomenon highlighted in research on science 
education, wherein core knowledge intuitions or early-acquired science concepts were shown 
to co-exist alongside later-acquired science concepts. The case study this dissertation uses is 
the Christian God concept as it exists in the minds of Christian religious adherents. Below, I 
articulate a view for why core knowledge mechanisms should be resistant to functional 
reorganization (i.e. should not be revisable), thereby articulating a theoretical basis for the 
representational co-existence hypothesis. Then, I highlight similarities between the Christian 
God concept and concepts in science, all of which are evolutionarily new, and discuss why 
                                                 
3 When the novel problem is fitness-relevant then evolution may select for structural and functional 
changes to the formerly co-opted mechanism, at which point the now new mechanism comes to be referred to as 
an exaptation. Of course, all new adaptations were built from prior structures, whether adaptations or by-
products. 
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the Christian God makes for a particularly interesting case study of the representational co-
option and co-existence hypotheses. I conclude by briefly outlining the experiments reported 
in this dissertation. The key phenomena investigated in this dissertation are summarized in 
Fig. 1 below. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The representational co-option and representational co-existence hypotheses. 
 
2. Natural selection and functional reorganization 
 
The design specifications of psychological mechanisms are closely linked to the 
adaptive problems these mechanisms evolved to solve. In theory, these design specifications 
can include the capacity to be partially or fully reorganized to solve different adaptive 
problems (particularly relevant, for example, when adaptive problems exist only in some life 
history stages), or the capacity to be temporarily or permanently digested if the neural tissue 
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is no longer needed. The question is not whether these capacities can evolve, but whether the 
requisite selection pressure for their evolution would have existed. The answer is yes, we can 
expect the psychological mechanisms of humans and other organisms to in fact be designed 
in this way, because neural tissue is energetically costly to build and maintain, so once it is 
no longer needed it should be reorganized or digested, with the energy used for the building 
and maintenance of other systems.4 
For example, the sea squirt has a well-developed nervous system in the larval stage of 
its life during which it disperses. But once it metamorphoses into the adult, sedentary phase 
of its life, it digests most its nervous system – once it no longer needs a nervous system it is 
better off digesting it and using the energy for the building and maintenance of other systems. 
A less extreme example (yet one which strongly challenges empiricist intuitions) is the 
unique strategy to survive in winter evolved in shrews as an alternative to hibernation or 
migration to warmer climates. In winter, shrews temporarily digest some of their brain and 
body mass, which they subsequently re-build in spring (for recent data with the red-toothed 
shrew see Lázaro, Dechmann, LaPoint, Wikelski, & Hertel, 2017). 
We find similar adaptations in humans. For example, critical periods in humans and 
related species may involve instances of local neural tissue reorganization (e.g. see Pinker, 
1994, for critical periods in language development; critical periods have similarly been found 
for many other capacities such as face recognition in humans and in macaques). The 
reorganization of the visual cortex in the congenitally blind for auditory and tactile 
perception is a more extreme example of a neural reorganization in humans, though possibly 
not one that was naturally selected (and possibly one that is highly limited in that the visual 
                                                 
4 A second, albeit more speculative argument for functional reorganization, is that mechanisms that are 
no longer needed may interfere with the functioning of ones that are. 
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cortex may have evolved to represent spatial relationships and can therefore only be 
reorganized in these two ways). 
However, naturally selected local, and especially more general, neural tissue 
reorganization should be uncommon to the extent that most psychological mechanisms 
continue to serve adaptive functions that are necessary throughout the life of an organism. 
The human visual system, for example, is just as critical for the survival of a toddler as it is 
to the survival of an adult. 
Moreover, in humans, some psychological mechanisms may evolve to be resistant to 
functional reorganization. Since mental mechanisms track fitness-relevant features of the 
world, selection pressures may specifically design some mechanisms to not be re-
programmable so as to resist occasional inconsistent bits of information, either direct 
(personal experience) or indirect (communication), when this decreases fitness. Indeed, the 
existence of an entire set of adaptations designed to evaluate communicated information 
(Sperber et al., 2010) is strong evidence that resisting being manipulated by communicated 
information was an ancestrally fitness-relevant problem. For example, no person is 
omniscient, ancestrally or nowadays, therefore, even if particular personal experiences were 
compatible with an interpretation of another as omniscience, a well-designed mechanism 
should not choose this interpretation but instead continue searching for alternative ones.5 
The need to resist occasional inconsistent information corrupting the functional 
organization of some psychological mechanisms is related to the notion of cognitive 
                                                 
5 Note that this is separate from error management considerations which predict that we may 
occasionally attribute individuals with more knowledge than they actually have. For example, this is the “liar-
liar-pants-on-fire” or the Pinocchio phenomenon wherein when we lie we may attribute others with knowledge 
of our lies (we feel as if others can “see” that we lied), to among other functions motivate us to confess to our 
lies. 
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impenetrability, wherein some mechanisms are partially or completely impenetrable to 
information from other mechanisms. For example, in the Müller-Lyer illusion, two lines of 
identical lengths appear to the visual system to be of different lengths. The visual system 
“believes” that the lines are of different lengths, and this belief is impenetrable to consciously 
held beliefs that the lines are of identical lengths. 
In both this and the aforementioned cases of resistance to functional reorganization, 
mental mechanisms resist inconsistent information, either in long-lasting re-programming of 
their neural circuits or in short-lasting information processing and behavior regulation. 
 
3. Previous research on representational coexistence in scientific concepts, and the 
problem of personal experience 
 
Previous research on the acquisition of evolutionarily new concepts in science seems 
to support the position that core knowledge concepts cannot be revised. A few well-
documented cases are:  
(1) Core knowledge concepts about physical entities and their spatio-temporal 
mechanics (also termed the “object concept”), or “naïve beliefs” that elaborate on the object 
concept, have been argued to co-exist alongside conflicting theories in quantum physics and 
cosmology (Shtulman & Valcarvel, 2012; Shtulman & Harrington, 2016). 
(2) Shtulman and colleagues (Shtulman, 2006; Shtulman & Schulz, 2008) have 
argued that essentialist intuitions, which are intuitions wherein individuals within a species 
have “essences” that do not change, co-exist alongside the conflicting theory of evolution by 
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natural selection wherein these essences (which evolutionary biologists tell us are called 
“genes”) do change or mutate. 
(3) Goldberg and Thompson-Schill (2009) have demonstrated that childhood beliefs 
wherein moving inanimate entities such as the sun or moon, but not nonmoving living 
entities such as plants, are believed to be alive, still exist in the minds of adults, including 
biology professors (Piaget, 1929/1960, termed these intuitions, which link animacy to 
motion, “childhood animism”). 
However, in all the above instances (and others not reviewed here6), core knowledge 
concepts (or naïve theories) are confounded with personal experience: core knowledge 
concepts are consistent with personal experience, but acquired science concepts are 
inconsistent with it. Thus, the argument that core knowledge concepts are stabilized by 
personal experience is an alternative to the argument that core knowledge concepts have 
evolved to be resistant to functional reorganization. 
First, consider the object concept and personal experience with physical objects. 
While to our perceptual systems physical objects are solid, quantum physics tells us that they 
are made out of nuclei surrounded by probability clouds, or while to our perceptual system 
physical objects move in a continuous path through space, quantum physics tells us that 
                                                 
 
6 For example, Kelemen and colleagues (e.g. Kelemen, 1999) have shown that children erroneously 
reason about the natural world as purpose-based (e.g. they will preferentially endorse statements such as “rocks 
are pointy so that animals won’t sit on them” rather than “rocks are pointy because bits of stuff piled up over 
time”; this has been termed “promiscuous teleology”); adults do not exhibit erroneous purpose-based reasoning 
on explicit tasks, but do on implicit tasks (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012). 
Furthermore, explicit erroneous purpose-based reasoning such as that exhibited by children is exhibited by older 
adults with Alzheimer’s disease (Lombrozo, Kelemen, & Zaitchik, 2007). 
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particles can disappear in one location and reappear in another. 7 Further, personal experience 
with physical objects is consistent with elaborated naïve beliefs. For example, consider the 
belief that the earth revolves around the earth. A person’s visual system will receive 
information about the changing spatial position of an object if the person is in motion or if 
the object is in motion. But, if the person is standing in place his mind will rule-out the 
former and conclude that the object is moving, and this conclusion will be valid for almost all 
physical objects this person will interact with throughout his life. However, this inferential 
process may also be what gives rise to the belief that the sun is moving around the earth.8 9 
We may therefore acquire the new scientific belief that the earth revolves around the sun, but 
not revise our naïve belief that the sun revolved around the earth either because it is built 
around the object concept, and the object concept cannot be revised, or because it is 
stabilized by personal experience. 
Second, evolution by natural selection almost always occurs on time scales that are 
too slow for people to perceive in a single lifetime. Because of this, it might seem as if 
individuals within a species have essences (genes) that do not change from generation to 
generation (a notable exception might be artificial selection of domesticated animals). We 
                                                 
7 A notable case where personal experience with physical objects seems to be inconsistent with naïve 
beliefs is the studies by McCloskey and colleagues (e.g. McCloskey, Caramazza, & Green, 1980) of curvilinear 
motion. 
8 Acknowledging that technically that the sun is moving around the earth is not wrong: it's all a matter 
of how one chooses their frame of reference (what is moving relative to what). It is, however, simpler to 
describe the motion of the planets if one chooses a frame of reference in which the planets move relative to the 
sun. 
 
9 Dawkins proposes a slightly different explanation for this illusion: “In the limited world in which our 
brains evolved, small objects are more likely to move than large ones, which are seen as the background to 
movement. As the world rotates, objects that seem large because they are near - mountains, trees and buildings, 
the ground itself - all move in exact synchrony with each other and with the observer, relative to heavenly 
bodies such as the sun and stars. Our evolved brains project an illusion of movement onto them rather than the 
mountains and trees in the foreground.” (2006, p. 367) 
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may therefore acquire the new scientific belief that genes mutate (and that natural selection 
acts on phenotypes that are built by these different genotypes), but not revise our naïve belief 
that species have essences either because this belief is built around essentialist intuitions, and 
essentialist intuitions cannot be revised, or because it is stabilized by personal experience.10 
Third, Leslie (1994) has argued that the Theory of Bodies (ToBy) mechanism 
searches for cues of self-propelled motion and from these infers the agency of physical 
entities or “bodies”. As far as ToBy is concerned, plants are more perceptually similar to 
inanimate objects than to animals, because neither plants nor inanimate objects show cues of 
self-propelled motion. Thus, acquiring the new scientific belief that plants are alive may not 
revise our naïve belief that plants are inanimate either because this belief is built around the 
plant core knowledge concept, or because it is stabilized by personal experience including 
ToBy inferences (see Wertz & Wynn, 2014a,b, for recent evidence that the mind contains a 
core plant concept); the opposite applies to the scientific belief that moving entities such as 
the sun or moon are not alive. 
In sum, processes of conceptual development are responsive to both personal 
experience and communication, the latter likely being the primary means by which new 
science concepts are acquired. However, findings that core knowledge concepts co-opted to 
form new science concepts coexist alongside the science concepts can either be due to a 
unique property of core knowledge concepts wherein they cannot be revised, or due to 
                                                 
10 A related point is that individuals within most non-human species also appear to be phenotypically 
similar, because most phenotypic differences are not visible and/or attended to. Consider that the most 
distinctive feature we use in differentiating human: the face. The face is of little to no use to human adults in 
differentiating individuals from other species, even ones closely related to humans like monkeys (Pascalis, 
Haan, & Nelson, 2002); our brains simply did not evolve to differentiate individuals from other species. A 
related possibility, then, is that our personal experience with other species is consistent with intuitions about 
species as phenotypically identical, and inconsistent with another requirement of evolution by natural selection, 
which is that there be phenotypic differences between individuals within a species. 
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personal experience that is consistent with the core knowledge concepts and inconsistent with 
the new science concepts; strong evidence that core knowledge concepts cannot be revised 
requires a domain where there is little to no personal experience that is consistent with the 
core knowledge concepts co-opted to acquire the new ones. 
 
4. Religious concepts may circumvent the problem of personal experience 
In contrast to science concepts, religion concepts such as concepts of extraordinary 
beings are not inconsistent with personal experience: religious adherents mostly have no 
personal experience with extraordinary beings. In fact, the lack of personal experience with 
extraordinary beings may be considered as evidence consistent with particular characteristics 
of these beings. For example, the lack of personal experience with a material God can, to 
Christian religious adherents, be evidence of God’s incorporeality.11 
However, religious adherents do report having religious experiences (e.g. Taves, 
1999, 2011); does this undermine the argument that the God concept can be used as a case 
study of the hypothesis that core knowledge concepts cannot be revised? Experiences that are 
interpreted as religious experiences are ubiquitous across the world’s religious traditions 
(Taves, 2011), and are often at the core of new religious movements (Kinsella, 2016; Taves, 
In Press). Evangelical Christians in the Midwestern U.S., for example, focus on religious 
experiences which they try to bring about via various practices: for example, they learn to 
interpret bodily sensations as communication from God (Luhrmann, 2012; most other 
Protestant denominations focus on religious experience significantly less, though religious 
                                                 
11 Acknowledging that Christian religious adherents do have certain experiences that can be very 
loosely interpreted as experiences with a material God, as for example Catholics who believe that Jesus is 
literally physically present in the consecrated Eucharistic wafer. 
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experiences are nonetheless a part of the theologies of these denominations; e.g., on 
Aldersgate Day, Methodists commemorate the religious experience of John Wesley, one of 
the founders of Methodism); or the “Afterlife Movement”, a new religious movement of 
primarily New Age spiritual-but-not-religious practitioners, focuses on a variety of 
experiences, including “meaningful coincidences” that are often interpreted as signs of the 
presence of extraordinary beings or God (Kinsella, 2016). 
The studies reported herein were conducted with participants affiliated with 
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Evangelicalism (a branch of Protestantism). While Catholics 
and Protestant are mostly not experientially oriented (with the notable exceptions of 
Charismatic Catholics and historically Black Protestants), Evangelicals are. But which 
experiences do experientially oriented Christians reports? Charismatic Catholics, historically 
Black Protestants, and Evangelicals focus on religious experiences as a way to have a 
personal relationship with God. Critically, in many instances these experiences are 
inconsistent, not consistent, with the core person concept. For example, Evangelical 
Christians might learn to hear the voice of God or to otherwise interpret bodily sensations as 
communication from God (Luhrmann, 2012). But an experience of hearing the voice of God 
in the absence of God’s physical presence is an experience consistent with the belief that God 
is incorporeal, and inconsistent with a person representation of God (we hear the voices of 
persons when they are physically present). In other instances, religious experiences might be 
neutral with respect to the core person concept, such as when experientially oriented religious 
adherents learn to feel God’s love. 
Thus, the existence of ordinary experiences that are interpreted to be personal 
experiences of God does not necessarily undermine the argument presented herein. The God 
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concept can be used as a case study of the hypothesis that core knowledge concepts cannot be 
revised because unlike science concepts it controls for the effects of personal experience. 
Religious adherents mostly have no personal experiences with God, and when they do, these 
experiences are either consistent with an omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and 
incorporeal God concept, and not with a person representation of God, or they are neutral 
with respect to both (e.g. feeling God’s love). 
 
5. Dissertation experiments 
My dissertation includes six experiments in total. In the sentence verification 
paradigm used throughout the experiments reported here, Christian religious adherents were 
asked to evaluate statements for which core knowledge intuitions about persons and acquired 
Christian theology about God were consistent (i.e., true according to both [e.g., “God has 
beliefs that are true”] or false according to both [e.g., “All beliefs God has are false”]) or 
inconsistent (i.e., true on intuition but false theologically [e.g., “God has beliefs that are 
false”] or false on intuition but true theologically [e.g., “All beliefs God has are true”]). 
In Exp. 1-3 (Chapter 2) I review early findings on representational co-option and co-
existence (Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998), along with more recent criticism of these 
studies (Shtulman, 2008). I then present data in support of representational co-option and co-
existence. Exp. 1-2 present findings of worse performance on items that are inconsistent 
versus consistent with core concepts (i.e., lower accuracy and slower response time on 
inconsistent versus consistent items). Exp. 3 rules out an alternative interpretation of these 
findings by showing that there are no differences in performance between items when the 
extraordinary religious entity (God) is replaced with an ordinary one (a priest).  
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In Exp. 4 (Chapter 3) I expand on the findings of Exp. 1-3, showing that 
representational co-existence is invariant with age, and that core knowledge intuitions of God 
as a person may not be revisable even with many decades of experience with Christian 
theology.  
In Exp. 5-6 (Chapter 5) I expand on the findings of the previous experiments, which 
primarily focused on God’s psychology, to God’s physicality. I critically evaluate the 
intuitive mind-body dualism hypothesis (Bloom, 2005; extensively discussed in Chapter 4), 
showing that, contra Bloom and colleagues (e.g. Bloom, 2005) and Shtulman and Lindeman 
(2016), the God concept co-opts an embodied person concept, not a disembodied person 
concept. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 Core knowledge intuitions about persons co-exist and interfere with acquired Christian 
theology about God 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The tendency to attribute supernatural beings (e.g. gods, spirits, ancestor spirits, and 
divine beings) with person-like characteristics is widespread among present and past human 
cultures; indeed, it is noted in writings dating as far back as ancient Greece (e.g. Boyer, 
1994a, b; 2001). However, it was only with relatively recent theoretical advances in cognitive 
science that this tendency could be explained via the evolved, universal information-
processing architecture of the human mind: supernatural beings are attributed with person-
like characteristics because they are formed by co-opting the evolved person concept (also 
referred to as a “person template”; e.g. Boyer, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). The person 
concept consists of default inferences about persons, such as about their physicality, biology 
and psychology which reliably develop from a skeletal set of inferences about persons 
present in infancy and from associated learning adaptations (e.g. Baillargeon, 2004; 
Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Carey, 1985, 2009; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002, 2006; Spelke, 
1990). 
However, supernatural beings are also believed to have extraordinary characteristics 
which are inconsistent with default inferences about persons.12 The exact characteristics 
                                                 
12 We do not evaluate in the current study whether acquisition of these beliefs constitutes conceptual 
change or belief revision (see Carey, 2009, for a thorough discussion of this distinction). 
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depend on the supernatural being and the theological tradition. For example, in all 
mainstream Christian denominations God is believed to be omniscient, while persons are 
intuitively believed to have limited perceptual and mental abilities (e.g. Boyer, 1994a,b, 
2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001). In this study we investigate the hypothesis proposed by 
Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 1996, 1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009; also see 
Boyer 1994a, b, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001; Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998, 1999) 
according to which characteristics attributed to supernatural beings which are inconsistent 
with default inferences about persons (1) do not replace these inferences, but (2) co-exist 
with them in the minds of religious believers.13 
 
1.1. Previous research 
 
A variety of studies have examined the psychological, biological, and physical 
characteristics adults attribute to God, concluding that they are quite willing to attribute to 
God certain human characteristics, especially certain kinds of mental states (e.g. Gray, Gray 
& Wegner, 2007; Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009; Shtulman, 
2008, Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016; see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016, for a recent 
review of psychological attributions to God by children and adults). For example, Gray, 
Gray, and Wegner (2007) suggested that there are two distinct dimensions of mental state 
                                                 
 
13 Sperber and colleagues further hypothesize that (3) acquired beliefs that are inconsistent with core 
intuitions exist in a specialized meta-representational “bubble” which isolates them from core concepts which 
exist in a mental data-base of beliefs. In contrast to the data-base of beliefs which can be accessed 
unconsciously and spontaneously, meta-representations can only be accessed consciously (e.g. Sperber, 1997, 
2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009; for a related discussion of dual-process theory see Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; also see Mercier & Sperber, 2011). We do not evaluate this hypothesis which, while 
interesting, is beyond the scope of the experiments reported here. 
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attributions: Agency (consisting of mental states such as self-control, morality, memory, 
emotion, recognition, planning, communication, and thought) and Experience (consisting of 
mental states such as hunger, fear, pain, pleasure, rage, desire, personality, consciousness, 
pride, embarrassment, and joy), and that adults are significantly more likely to attribute to 
God Agency than Experience. Additionally, in their study participants reporting stronger 
religious beliefs were more likely to attribute Agency to God (see their Supplementary 
Material); elsewhere other individual difference variables such as attachment style (e.g. 
Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2008; Kirkpatrick, 2005) were found to be associated with different 
mental state attributions. 
Although these studies are compatible with the co-existence hypothesis they are also 
compatible with two (not mutually exclusive) alternatives. First, it is possible that some 
adults in these studies did not acquire the relevant theological doctrines to fully replace all 
default inferences about persons in their representations of God. The developing 
understanding of God’s extraordinary characteristics is compatible with this alternative: for 
example, although the ability to attribute infallibility (a component of omniscience) to God is 
acquired in childhood, a full understanding of omniscience requires many years to develop. 
Lane, Wellman, and Evans (2010) found that at the age when children begin attributing false 
beliefs to persons on explicit tasks (between 4 and 5 years) they also attribute false beliefs to 
God, but that this latter tendency decreases with age as children begin attributing infallibility 
to God; Lane, Wellman, and Evans (2012) found that religiously schooled children begin 
attributing false beliefs to God at earlier ages than secularly schooled children, and that in 
children who attribute fallibility to persons (e.g. by explicitly attributing to persons false 
beliefs), familiarity with information about God is associated with earlier attributions of 
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infallibility to God. Incidentally, religiously schooled children in their study attributed 
infallibility to beings other than God at earlier ages as well (e.g. Mr. Smart, who was 
described as a man who knows everything). This suggests that religiously schooled children 
may be earlier to understand extraordinary mental states in general, not solely God’s mental 
states (see also Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2014). 
However, a full understanding of omniscience develops significantly later: although 
the breadth of omniscience (having knowledge of all domains) is fully appreciated by middle 
childhood, the depth of omniscience (having all knowledge within a specific domain) is only 
appreciated by late adolescence to early adulthood (Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2014). Thus, it 
is possible, given the years it takes to acquire a full understanding of certain extraordinary 
characteristics (e.g. omniscience), that a full understanding of only some extraordinary 
characteristics develops by early adulthood (the age typically examined in studies of adults’ 
attributions of characteristics to God); studies showing explicit attributions of human 
characteristics to God may, therefore, merely show that adults do not fully know or 
understand the nature of God’ extraordinary characteristics in Christian theology. 
Second, in studies investigating the attribution of various characteristics to God using 
self-report methodologies it is possible that some adults have acquired the relevant 
theological doctrines but intentionally deviated from them in their reports. For example, in 
her ethnographic study of Evangelical Christians in Chicago and the Bay Area Luhrmann 
(2012) found that many of her participants attributed person-like mental states to God. But, 
when pressed, they would acknowledge that these attributions deviated from the theology of 
their group; these attributions, they said, allowed them to experience God more closely and 
intimately.  
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The primary line of research to have investigated the co-existence hypothesis (often 
termed “theological incorrectness”) which controls for the above alternatives, are the studies 
of memory confusions in religious adults by Barrett and colleagues (Christian adults in 
Barrett & Keil, 1996; Hindu adults in Barrett, 1998). For example, in Barrett and Keil (1996) 
participants asked to recall narratives, such as about God intervening to answer a prayer, 
were shown to mistakenly add physical and/or psychological limitations to God’s actions not 
present in the original narratives (e.g. that to intervene God has to finish answering another 
prayer or stop another action, such as helping an angel work on a crossword puzzle), and 
which were not in accord with the participants’ self-reported theological beliefs. Barrett and 
Keil interpreted these memory confusions as showing that in recalling the narratives about 
God participants mistakenly relied on their intuitions about persons (e.g. sequential action). 
However, one major critique of the studies by Barrett and colleagues is that a person-
like representation of God was implied in the narratives themselves (e.g. Shtulman, 2008; see 
Hyde, 1990, for a similar critique of studies in which children are asked to draw an image of 
God). As Shtulman (2008) notes: 
“God was described in other stories as pushing a large stone, looking at the rock, listening to the birds, 
enjoying the smell, and helping an angel work on a crossword puzzle. Any participants who might have 
disagreed with the anthropomorphic implications of these statements were still required to reason on their basis. 
To these participants, stories about a looking, listening, helping God would be as incongruent with their 
personal beliefs as stories about a looking, listening, helping teapot, yet one could hardly fault them for drawing 
anthropomorphic inferences consistent with the stories’ premises.” 
Shtulman (2008) considers it plausible that this language may have contributed to the 
person concept based responses in the recall of the narrative in the Barrett and Keil (1996) 
and Barrett (1998) studies.14  
                                                 
14 A second objection raised by Shtulman concerns the overall rate of anthropomorphic responding in 
the studies by Barrett and colleagues for narratives involving religious agents, which he points out was (1) 
lower than 100%, and (2) not substantially different from the rate of anthropomorphic responding observed for 
narratives involving a supercomputer (a non-religious agent with full information access; ibid. p. 1125). 
However, a problem with evaluating this objection is that there is no consensus on what amount of 
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1.2. The current study 
 
The primary goal of the current study is to provide a novel test of the co-existence 
hypothesis in religious beliefs, using the case of Christian beliefs about God. The 
methodology used is the sentence verification task of Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) which 
consists of an explicit measure of response accuracy, and an implicit measure of response 
time. In the task participants are required to endorse or reject statements of two broad kinds: 
consistent statements that are true or false according to both core intuitions about persons and 
Christian theology about God (e.g. “God has beliefs that are true”; “All beliefs God has are 
false”), and inconsistent statements that are either true intuitively but false theologically (e.g. 
“God has beliefs that are false”) or false intuitively but true theologically (e.g. “All beliefs 
God has are true”). 
As per the outline of the person concept in the introduction, intuitive beliefs about 
persons were derived from reliably developing default inferences about persons that have 
been well established by research with infants and toddlers. Acquired beliefs about God were 
derived from the most common Christian theological beliefs about God: omniscience, 
omnipotence, omnipresence, and incorporeality. As reviewed in Section 1.1., previous 
studies suggest that acquisition of these beliefs begins as early as the preschool years (e.g. 
Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010, 2012), and these beliefs are therefore highly likely to be 
known to adult religious adherents (e.g. see Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2014, for the 
developing understanding of omniscience). 
                                                 
anthropomorphism – beyond demonstrating that it exists – is required to support the co-existence hypothesis, or 
how minimal such responding needs to be to refute it. 
24 
 
The current study examined four primary predictions which follow from the co-
existence hypothesis: 
(1) If core intuitions co-exist with acquired beliefs that are inconsistent with them, 
then they might also interfere with those beliefs, and this interference might cause 
inconsistent statements to be responded to less accurately and more slowly than consistent 
statements. In principle co-existence is possible without interference (and interference might 
be so weak as to be imperceptible to our methods), but since interference necessarily requires 
co-existence, to demonstrate interference would also be to demonstrate co-existence. The 
first prediction therefore aims to support and extend the co-existence hypothesis as shown for 
scientific beliefs (e.g. Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012) to the domain of religious beliefs. 
(2) If acquired beliefs and core intuitions are in conflict then it is plausible that there 
are cognitive mechanisms involved in resolving this conflict, and that the efficiency of the 
functioning of these mechanisms might be decreased by putting participants under cognitive 
load. For example, previous findings suggest that when participants are put under time 
pressure their tendency to endorse intuitive but erroneous teleological (purpose- or function-
based) explanations for natural phenomena is increased (e.g. Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; 
Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012). Therefore, we predicted that when put under time 
pressure participants would show a decrease in accuracy on inconsistent statements more so 
than on consistent statements. 
(3) Kelemen and Rossett (2009) proposed that executive inhibition suppresses 
erroneous teleological explanations, and found that a measure of inhibition (the behavioral 
Stroop task) was one predictor of scientific accuracy on their task. Similarly, Lindeman and 
Aarnio (2007) argue that ontological confusions are based on intuitions, and there is recent 
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evidence that the tendency to make ontological confusions is related to individual differences 
in the efficiency of inhibition (Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013; see also Lindeman, Riekki, & 
Hood, 2011). If inhibition is the mechanism which resolves conflicts between intuitions and 
acquired beliefs then it is plausible that individual differences in inhibition, as indexed by the 
behavioral Stroop task (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012; 
Lindeman, Riekki, & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013), more so than other 
executive functions such as working memory (Broadway & Engel, 2010; Redick et al., 
2012), would be related to performance on the sentence verification task. 
(4) We consider it unlikely that any amount of practice with acquired beliefs could 
replace inconsistent intuitions (e.g. Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, 
& Seston, 2012; Shtulman & Harrington, 2016), but some findings suggest that practice 
could attenuate the effects of interference from inconsistent intuitions (e.g. Kelemen & 
Rosset, 2009; these findings and others are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.). We 
therefore predicted that individual differences in practice with acquired religious and 
scientific beliefs (indexed with measures of religion education and science education) would 
be related to performance on the sentence verification task. 
In contrast to the predictions listed above, the alternative hypothesis whereby 
theological characteristics replace default inferences about persons (but adults intentionally 
deviate from theology in self-report measures) predicts that: (1) under time pressure there 
should be an identical decrease in response accuracies on consistent and inconsistent 
statements, because participants are given less time to select a response, and (2) among 
correct responses – those responses where person-like characteristics would not have been 
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applied – there should be no difference in response times between consistent and inconsistent 
statements. 
A secondary goal of the current study was to conduct a full replication of the 
Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) experiment assessing the parallel case of the co-existence of 
early- and later-acquired scientific beliefs. Early-acquired scientific beliefs are often 
inconsistent with culturally transmitted (later-acquired) scientific beliefs, yet they are 
common in children and were historically common among the educated adults of various 
cultures (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). For example, 6-year-olds hold beliefs about the shape 
of the earth which are inconsistent with the culturally transmitted model of a spherical earth 
with people living all around it, but are consistent with a mental model of a flat earth with 
people living on its top surface (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Vosniadou and Brewer (1992; 
also see Baumard & Boyer, 2013) have proposed that similarities in early scientific beliefs 
are due to developmental constraints caused by universal core intuitions (in the case of 
beliefs about the shape of the earth, Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992, proposed that these are due 
to universal intuitions that unsupported objects fall); the acquisition of novel scientific 
beliefs, similarly to the acquisition of theology, may therefore require resolving a conceptual 
conflict with core intuitions. 
Finally, in the current climate of concern over the replicability of findings across 
science, but especially in psychological science (e.g. Ioannidis, 2005; Nosek & Lakens, 
2014; see also other papers in that special issue), undertaking replications of existing findings 
alongside attempted extensions is one valuable additional tool available to the psychological 
scientific community that might eventually offset the problem of (lack of) replication. 
Accordingly, the new religion statements were intermixed in the current study with the entire 
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set of science statements used by Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) so as to determine if that 
result replicates, albeit in a slightly different design. It was predicted that the same pattern of 
findings would emerge. 
 
2.0. Experiment 1 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 44 university students (56% female), ranging in age from 18 to 24 
(M = 20), and drawn from two different samples: (1) two local churches, one Catholic and 
one Charismatic, that serve an almost exclusively college-aged population (these participants 
were paid for their time), and (2) the psychology participant pool at the University of 
California, Santa Barbara (these participants received class credit). Fifty four percent of 
participants identified as White, 25% identified as Hispanic or Latino, and 20% identified as 
Asian. 
In order to ensure primary exposure to and belief in Christianity, participants were 
pre-selected to have been brought up within, and currently identify with, Christianity. 
Despite this initial preselection, five participants did not match these criteria (all were 
brought up as atheist or agnostic or currently identified as such). These five were not 
included in the final sample (N = 39). Participants were assigned pseudo-randomly to receive 
the task under speeded instructions (n = 20) or unspeeded instructions (n = 19). Of the final 
sample, 95% of participants were brought up within the same Christian denomination with 
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which they currently identified, and 95% identified as religious believers (indexed as a 
minimum rating of “slightly religious” on a religiosity question). 
Of the final sample, 50% of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 41% identified 
as simply “Christian”, and 9% identified as one of a number of Protestant Christian 
denominations (e.g. Baptist, Lutheran). Most participants who identified as “Christian” in 
this sample reported being affiliated with the local Charismatic church. On a 4-point Likert 
scale (range 0 to 3; Not at all, Slightly, Moderately, Very), participants on average reported 
being moderately religious (M = 2.20, SD = .83) and moderately spiritual (M = 2.08, SD = 
.87), and the two were highly correlated (r = .522, p = .001).  
  
2.1.2. Design 
The primary dependent variable was response accuracy, and with respect to this 
dependent variable, the design was a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: 
Consistent versus Inconsistent) x 2 (Instructions: Speeded versus Unspeeded) factorial with 
within-subjects repeated measures on the first two factors.  
A secondary dependent variable, response time, was collected for participants in the 
speeded instructions condition. For this dependent variable the design was a 2 (Domain: 
Religion versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) factorial with 
within-subjects repeated measures. 
 
2.1.3. Materials 
The religion statements (48 in total) were constructed in groups of four statements, 
with each group targeting a particular characteristic of God that is inconsistent with a core 
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intuition about persons (see section 1.2 for a more detailed discussion). Following Shtulman 
and Valcarcel (2012), each group of statements was constructed such that there was one that 
was true on both intuition and theology, one that was true on neither, one that was true only 
on intuition, and one that was true only on theology. In this way one set of statements 
(consistent on intuition and theology) served as a baseline to which the other (inconsistent on 
intuition and theology) could be compared, and within each group there was an equal number 
of statements that were objectively true or false. Additionally, the four statements within 
each group were balanced in terms of overall sentence structure, complexity, and length in 
words. Example statements appear in Table 1, and a full list of all religion statements can be 
found in the Supplementary Material. 
 
 
 
Table 1
Sample Statements from the Domain of Religion.
Consistency Intuition Theology Religion Statements
Consistent T T God has beliefs that are true.
F F All beliefs God has are false.
Inconsistent T F God has beliefs that are false.
F T All beliefs God has are true.
Consistent T T God can hear what I say out loud.
F F God can't hear what I say out loud.
Inconsistent T F God can't hear what I say to myself.
F T God can hear what I say to myself.
Consistent T T God can be present at my church and at other churches as well.
F F God is never present at my church, nor is He present anywhere else.
Inconsistent T F Sometimes God is at my church, and sometimes He is at other churches.
F T God is at all times both at my church and at other churches.
Note. Consistent satements are true on both intuition and theology; inconsistent statements are true on one and false on the other.
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The science statements were the same 200 statements used by Shtulman and 
Valcarcel, covering 10 areas of mathematics and science (astronomy, evolution, fractions, 
genetics, germs, matter, mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves). Example 
statements appear in Table 2, and a full list of all science statements can be found in the 
Supplementary Material. 
 
 
 
Because the executive functions and practice measures were included to evaluate 
their relationship with interference, a sentence verification task interference score was 
calculated for each participant as the difference between consistent and inconsistent 
statements (for both response accuracies and times), with higher scores indicating stronger 
interference. 
Table 2
Sample Statements from the Domain of Science.
Consistency Intuition Science Science Statements
Consistent T T Rocks are composed of matter.
F F Numbers are composed of matter.
Inconsistent T F Fire is composed of matter.
F T Air is composed of matter.
Consistent T T People turn food into energy.
F F Rocks turn food into energy.
Inconsistent T F Plants turn food into energy.
F T Bacteria turn food into energy.
Consistent T T Humans are descended from tree-dwelling creatures.
F F Humans are descended from plants.
Inconsistent T F Humans are descended from chimpanzees.
F T Humans are descended from sea-dwelling creatures.
Note. Consistent satements are true on both intuition and science; inconsistent statements are true on one and false on the other. Statements 
are from Shtulman & Valcarcel (2012).
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Additional materials included (1) a 144-item behavioral Stroop task (modified from 
Stroop, 1935) which included the following three conditions (48 items per condition): 
Congruent (the words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW appearing in red, blue, green, 
and yellow color, respectively), Incongruent (the words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and 
YELLOW appearing in a color different than the one they spell), and Neutral (the words 
LOT, SHIP, KNIFE, FLOWER – length-matched and frequency-matched to the color words, 
appearing in colors); a Stroop response time interference score is then calculated by 
averaging the difference between the Incongruent and Neutral, and Incongruent and 
Congruent conditions, (2) a running span working memory task (Broadway & Engel, 2010), 
and (3) a short survey seeking demographic information, self-report measures of religiosity 
and spirituality, extent of participants’ religious education, and extent of math and science 
education (indexed by asking participants to list all math and science courses they have taken 
in college). An education composite score (range 0 to 4) was calculated by summing the 
number of content areas – mathematics, biology, chemistry, and physics – participants took 
at least one course in. 
 
2.1.4. Procedure 
In a quiet testing room, groups of up to 6 participants took the experiment at semi-
private computer testing stations. Participants in both the speeded and unspeeded instructions 
conditions completed, in this order, the sentence verification task, the behavioral Stroop task, 
the working memory task, and the survey. In the speeded instructions condition the 
instructions to the sentence verification task emphasized both response accuracy and speed 
(in multiple parts of the instructions participants were told to “respond as quickly as you can, 
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while making as few mistakes as you can” and that “speed and accuracy are both very 
important”), and responses were collected via key presses to facilitate faster and less 
deliberate responding (presented via E-Prime software). In the unspeeded instructions 
condition the instructions emphasized accuracy only, and responses were presented in survey 
form (presented via Qualtrics software) to facilitate slower and more deliberate responding. 
In both instructions conditions the sentence verification task items were presented one-by-
one and in a randomized order (with religion and science items intermixed), and whether the 
right or left hand were used to respond “true” or “false” was randomized between 
participants. 
 
2.2. Results 
 
2.2.1. Sentence response accuracy 
 The primary hypothesis under test was that participants will be more accurate 
responding to items in which core intuitions are consistent with acquired beliefs in the 
domains of religion and science (see the Supplementary Material for response accuracies on 
individual items). The sentence response accuracy data were entered into a 2 (Domain: 
Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) X 2 (Instructions: 
Unspeeded versus Speeded) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures 
on the first two factors, revealing main effects of Domain (F 1, 37 = 348.7, p < .001, partial η2 
= .90) and Consistency (F 1, 37 = 226.2, p < .001, partial η2 = .86) qualified by an interaction 
between Domain and Consistency (F 1, 37 = 50.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .58); there was no 
main effect of Instructions, and the Instructions factor did not enter into any two- or three-
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way interactions (all Fs < 1.3, all ps = n.s.), so no further analyses involving it are reported. 
The interaction between Domain and Consistency is shown for both Instructions factors in 
Fig. 1. 
Simple main effect analyses confirmed that participants performed better on the 
religion than on the science items for both consistent and inconsistent items [t (38) = 12.42, p 
< .001, d = 2.75, and t (38) = 15.93, p < .001, d = 2.78, respectively], and that the interaction 
resulted from the size of the effect for consistency being more than twice as large for the 
science items than for the religion items [t (38) = 16.90, p < .001, d = 2.81, and t (38) = 6.06, 
p < .001, d = 1.15, respectively]. 15 
 
                                                 
15 Shapiro-Wilk tests revealed that several of the response accuracy distributions were not normal 
(consistent religion items in the unspeeded instructions condition: SW = .455, df = 20, p < .001; consistent and 
inconsistent religion items in the speeded instructions condition: SW = .599, df = 19, p < .001, SW = .681, df = 
19, p < .001, respectively). The simple main effects were therefore analyzed with non-parametric tests to 
supplement the parametric tests reported here. A series of planned comparisons using the Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank Test confirmed all findings reported here (all Zs < -4.83, all ps < .001). 
34 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean percent response accuracy on consistent and inconsistent items in the domains 
of religion and science, for both the speeded and unspeeded instructions conditions. Error 
Bars: +/- 1 SE. 
 
2.2.2. Sentence response time16 
Sentence response time data were collected for those participants who received 
speeded instructions (see the Supplementary Material for response times on individual 
items). Response time data for correct responses were entered into a 2 (Domain: Religion 
versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) repeated measures 
                                                 
16 A very small number of response time data points (<1%) were removed for being more than 3SD 
above or below the mean response time. 
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ANOVA, revealing a main effect of Consistency (F 1, 19 = 40.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .68); 
there was no main effect of Domain and no interaction (both Fs < 1.0, ps = n.s.). The main 
effect of Consistency is shown in Fig. 2. Simple main effect analyses confirmed that 
participants were faster on consistent than inconsistent items for both religion and science 
items (F 1, 19 = 11.58, p < .005, d = 0.34 and F 1, 19 = 29.55, p < .001, d = 0.61, respectively), 
and that there were no differences in response times between science and religion items for 
either consistent or inconsistent items (both Fs < 1.0, ps = n.s.). 
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Fig. 2. Mean response time (in milliseconds) on consistent and inconsistent items in the 
domains of religion and science, for the speeded instructions condition only. Error Bars: +/- 1 
SE. 
 
2.2.3. Associations with measures of executive functions 
The inhibition17 (Stroop response time interference scores: M = 95ms, SD = 72ms, for 
correct responses only) and working memory (M = 25.62, SD = 12.26) measures were 
entered into a correlational analysis with interference scores on accuracy (both speeded and 
unspeeded instructions) and response time (speeded instructions only) on the sentence 
verification task, for both the religion and science items. Neither of the two executive 
functions measures were correlated with either the accuracy or response time interference 
scores in either the religion or science domains (all ps = n.s.). The executive functions 
measures also were not correlated with each other (p = n.s.). 
 
2.2.4. Associations with measures of education 
The composite science education measure (M = 2.67, SD = 1.03) did not correlate 
with either accuracy (both speeded and unspeeded instructions) or response time (speeded 
instructions only) interference scores for science items (both ps = n.s.). Shtulman and 
Valcarcel (2012) similarly collected data on the math and science courses their participants 
took, and using a slightly different variable (total number of courses taken, rather than the 
composite score for content areas used here) did not find that it predicted any of the effects 
reported in their study. 
                                                 
17 Three participants did not complete the behavioral Stroop task, and 2 participants’ scores were 
removed for being more than 2SD above the mean Stroop response time interference score; 2 participants’ 
scores were removed for being more than 2SD above or below the mean working memory score. 
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Because both religious education variables were strongly skewed, Spearman’s rank-
order correlations were used instead of Pearson’s correlations. For religion items, neither 
church attendance nor theology study predicted interference scores for either accuracy (both 
speeded and unspeeded instructions) or response time (speeded instructions only); all ps = 
n.s. 
The lack of correlation is not because the religious education variables were too 
insensitive to pick up on differences in what people had learned about God. Church 
attendance did predict accuracy on consistent religion items (r = .376, p <.05), and 
marginally predicted accuracy on inconsistent religion items (r = .284, p = .079, 
respectively).  
 
3.0. Experiment 2 
 
The results of Experiment 1 support our first prediction by replicating and extending 
the findings of Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012) to show that, as in the domain of science, 
there is conflict between core intuitions and acquired beliefs in the domain of religion. Note 
that there was a large effect of domain on the accuracy scores reported in Experiment 1, with 
religion items being responded to more accurately than science items. While a comparison of 
the science and religion items was not a focus of this study, the difference was expected, 
given that the religion items were specifically derived from the most common characteristics 
attributed to God in Christian theology (omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and 
incorporeality), to make sure they would be known to adult religious adherents. 
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Our second prediction that the difference in response accuracies between consistent 
and inconsistent items would be greater under instruction to respond quickly was not 
supported; participants responded with almost identical levels of accuracy under speeded and 
unspeeded instructions. 
The lack of an effect for the instructions manipulation in the current study is not 
critical for evaluating the co-existence hypothesis, particularly given the strong effects of 
consistency on response accuracy and speed. Indeed, in Kelemen and Rosset (2009) and 
Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2012) there is evidence of the co-existence of teleological 
intuitions alongside scientific beliefs at the slowest response rates imposed. In their two 
experiments, endorsements of teleological explanations ranged from 29% to 42% in the 
unspeeded conditions, versus 47% to 54% in the speeded conditions.  
The most likely explanation for this outcome is that instructions to respond quickly 
alone were not a strong enough manipulation to put participants under time pressure in the 
speeded instructions condition. In some previous studies that used a speeding manipulation, 
instructions to respond quickly were accompanied by time limits on participants’ response 
windows (e.g. Kelemen & Rossett, 2009, Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012; Lindeman, 
Riekki & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). In Experiment 2, therefore, response 
time limits were added to the speeding manipulation. 
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants 
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Participants were 75 university students (80% female), ranging in age from 18 to 24 
(M = 19), and drawn from the psychology participant pool at the University of California, 
Santa Barbara. All participants received class credit for their time. Thirty eight percent of 
participants identified as White, 29% identified as Hispanic or Latino, and 29% identified as 
Asian, and 4% identified as “Other”. 
Participants were pre-selected according to criteria stricter than in Experiment 1. In 
addition to the selection criteria used in Experiment 1, the Christian denomination in which 
participants were raised had to be the same as the one with which they currently identified, 
and participants had to identify as religious believers, indexed as a minimum rating of 
“slightly religious” on a religiosity question. Four participants did not match these criteria, 
despite the initial pre-selection, and were not included in the final sample. The 71 
participants who met these criteria were assigned pseudo-randomly to receive the task under 
time limit (n = 32) or no time limit (n = 39). 
Of the final sample, 40% of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 39% as non-
denominational Christian, and 21% as one of a number of Protestant Christian denominations 
(e.g. Presbyterian, Baptist). Unlike in Experiment 1, where most of the participants who 
identified as “Christian” reported being affiliated with the local Charismatic church, none of 
the participants who identified as “Christian” in this experiment did. On a 4-point Likert 
scale (range 0 to 3) participants on average reported being moderately religious (M = 1.93, 
SD = .64) and moderately spiritual (M = 1.83, SD = .83), and the two were highly correlated 
(r = .571, p < .001). 
 
3.1.2. Design 
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As in Experiment 1 the primary dependent variable was response accuracy, and a 
secondary dependent variable was response time, which was collected for participants in both 
conditions. The design was a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: 
Consistent versus Inconsistent) x 2 (Condition: Time Limit versus No Time Limit) factorial 
design with within-subjects repeated measures on the first two factors. 
 
3.1.3. Materials 
The materials used were identical to those used in Experiment 1 with the exception of 
the behavioral Stroop task, which was modified to resemble the task used by Lindeman, 
Riekki and Hood (2011) and Svedholm and Lindeman (2013). The goal of this was to rule-
out a possible interpretation of the failure to find an association between the sentence 
verification task and the version of the behavioral Stroop task used in Experiment 1: In 
informal debriefings some participants reported using a response strategy whereby they only 
attended to the color in which words appeared by either directing their gaze to the periphery 
of the display or by squinting their eyes, thereby blurring the words which appear at the 
center of the display. In this modified version of the Stroop task the Neutral condition was 
replaced with a Word-Naming condition in which the words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and 
YELLOW appear in black, and participants are required to respond to the words that appear, 
which controls for the above response strategy by requiring them to direct their gaze to the 
center of the display. The Congruent condition was replaced with a Color-Naming condition 
in which a string of Xs appears in red, blue, green, or yellow color and participants are 
required to respond to the color in which the Xs appear. The Incongruent condition (the 
words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW appearing in a color different than the one they 
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spell) remained the same. A Stroop response time interference score is then calculated by 
subtracting response times on the Color-Naming condition from the Incongruent condition. 
 
3.1.4. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception: in the speeded 
condition participants were also told that each statement will appear for a short duration, and 
that the durations will be of variable times. The actual times (M = 3298ms, SD = 962ms; 
range 1605ms to 6749ms) were determined through pre-testing (N = 15) as the average 
reading time plus two standard deviations of each statement. The rationale for using variable 
times was that an arbitrary time limit would be insensitive to any overall differences in 
reading times for the sentences; variable times allowed us to approximately equate the time 
available for responding after reading. In the unspeeded condition the instructions 
emphasized response accuracy only and statements appeared until participants responded. In 
both the speeded and unspeeded conditions, responses were collected via key presses 
(presented via E-Prime software). 
 
3.2. Results 
 
3.2.1. Sentence response accuracy18 
As in Experiment 1, the primary hypothesis under test was that participants should be 
more accurate responding to items in which core intuitions are consistent with acquired 
                                                 
18 In the time limit condition responses that were timed-out were included in the analysis and 
considered incorrect. The response patterns reported in this section remained the same if instead responses that 
were timed-out were excluded from the analysis. 
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beliefs in the domains of religion and science. The accuracy data were subjected to a 2 
(Domain: Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) X 2 
(Condition: Time Limit versus No Time Limit) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
repeated measures on the first two factors, revealing main effects of Domain (F 1, 69 = 480.2, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .87), Consistency (F 1, 69 = 576.4, p < .001, partial η2 = .89), and 
Condition (F 1, 69 = 60.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .47), qualified by interactions between Domain 
and Consistency (F 1, 69 = 60.0, p < .001, partial η2 = .46) and Consistency and Condition (F 1, 
69 = 4.8, p < .05, partial η2 = .06). The interaction between Domain and Condition was not 
statistically significant (F 1, 69 = 2.4, p = .123, partial η2 = .03), and the factors did not enter 
into a three-way interaction (F 1, 69 = 2.7, p = .105, partial η2 = .04). The interaction between 
Domain and Consistency is shown for both the unspeeded (no time limit) and speeded (time 
limit) conditions in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3. Mean percent response accuracy on consistent and inconsistent items in the domains 
of religion and science, for both the time limit and no time limit conditions. A mean response 
accuracy of 50% represents chance responding. Error Bars: +/- 1 SE. 
 
Simple main effect analyses replicated the findings reported in Experiment 1 by 
confirming that participants performed better on the religion items than on the science items 
for both consistent and inconsistent items [t (70) = 14.92, p < .001, d = 2.17, and t (70) = 
20.32, p < .001, d = 2.56, respectively], and the interaction between Domain and Consistency 
reflected an effect size for consistency that was more than twice as large for the science items 
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than for the religion items [t (70) = 30.01, p < .001, d = 2.67, and t (70) = 9.30, p < .001, d = 
1.12, respectively]. 19 
An examination of the mean differences, separated by condition, between consistent 
and inconsistent religion (M unspeeded = 5.67%, versus M speeded = 11.35%) and science (M 
unspeeded = 11.41%, versus M speeded = 12.13%) items revealed that the two-way interaction 
between Consistency and Condition was primarily carried by the religion items.20 The 
response accuracy data suggest that this was caused by a floor effect in responses to 
inconsistent science items in the time limit condition: responses were at chance.  
An analysis of the timed-out responses in the time limit condition further supports 
this interpretation. A 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent 
versus Inconsistent) repeated-measures ANOVA with proportion of incorrect responses that 
were due to time-outs as the DV revealed main effects of Domain (F 1, 38 = 5.75, p < .05, 
partial η2 = .13) and Consistency (F 1, 38 = 15.48, p < .001, partial η2 = .29) and no 
interaction. A larger number of incorrect responses on science items than on religion items 
were due to time-outs (M science = 25.60% versus M religion = 18.70%), and a larger number of 
                                                 
19 Shapiro-Wilk tests revealed that several of the response accuracy distributions were not normal 
(consistent and inconsistent religion items in the no time limit condition: SW = .731, df = 32, p < .001, SW = 
.872, df = 32, p = .001, respectively; consistent religion items and inconsistent science items in the time limit 
condition: SW = .874, df = 39, p < .001, SW = .941, df = 39, p < .05, respectively). The simple main effects were 
therefore analyzed with non-parametric tests to supplement the parametric tests reported here. A series of 
planned comparisons using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test confirmed all findings reported here (all Zs < -6.67, 
all ps < .001). 
 
20 A separate examination of the religion and science items each via a 2 (Consistency: Consistent 
versus Inconsistent) X 2 (Condition: Time Limit versus No Time Limit) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) further confirmed that despite the absence of a three-way interaction the two-way interaction 
between Consistency and Condition was carried by the religion items (religion: F 1, 69 = 5.1, p < .05, partial η2 = 
.07; science: F 1, 69 = .22 p = n.s., partial η2 = .00). The results from this mixed ANOVA were additionally 
replicated with an Extended Linear-Mixed Effects Model, which accommodated different error-variances 
between the two Consistency factors (the error variance was greater for consistent than for inconsistent items in 
both Condition factors). The interaction for Consistency and Condition for the religion domain remained 
significant at p < 0.05. 
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incorrect responses on consistent items than on inconsistent items were due to time-outs (M 
consistent = 27.90% versus M inconsistent = 16.40%). A plausible interpretation of this is that 
overall the science items were more difficult than the religion items, but since they were 
allowed similar (or often shorter, given that the science items were often shorter) response 
windows, participants who tried to think about them for too long before responding were 
timed-out. The finding that there were more errors due to time-outs for consistent than 
inconsistent items is puzzling. A plausible interpretation of this is that participants were more 
likely to choose an answer at random for inconsistent items because these (particularly 
inconsistent science items) were more difficult. 
 
3.2.2. Sentence response time21 
Response times in the speeded condition were truncated by the time limit 
manipulation and were therefore excluded from this analysis. The mean response times for 
correct responses in the unspeeded condition are shown in Fig. 4. These data were entered 
into a 2 (Domain: Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). This revealed a main effect of 
Consistency (F 1, 31 = 37.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .55) and an interaction between Domain 
and Consistency (F 1, 31 = 21.98, p < .001, partial η2 = .42). Simple main effect analyses 
revealed no effect of Consistency for the religions items (t (31) = 1.21, p = n.s., d = .14). 
There was, however, a significant effect of Consistency for the science items (t (31) = 9.22, p 
< .001, d = .84). There was no main effect of Domain (F 1, 31 = 1.53, p = n.s., partial η2 = 
.05). Although consistent items elicited similar response times across the two domains, 
                                                 
21 A very small number of response time data points (<2%) were removed for being more than 3SD 
above or below the mean response time. 
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inconsistent items did not: Responses were faster when the inconsistent sentences involved 
religion compared to science (t (31) = 3.36, p = .002, d = .51). 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Mean response time (in milliseconds) on consistent and inconsistent items in the 
domains of religion and science, for the no time limit condition only. Error Bars: +/- 1 SE. 
 
3.2.3. Associations with measures of executive functions 
As in Experiment 1, inhibition (Stroop response time interference scores: M = 178ms, 
SD = 110ms, for correct responses only) and working memory (M = 22.75, SD = 10.46) were 
entered into a correlational analysis with interference scores on accuracy (analyzed 
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separately in the time limit and no time limit conditions) and response time (analyzed in the 
no time limit condition only) on the sentence verification task, for both the religion and 
science items.22 Neither inhibition nor working memory were correlated with accuracy or 
response time interference scores in any domain (all ps = n.s.). As in Experiment 1, the 
executive functions measures were not correlated with each other (p = n.s.), but the higher 
mean response time interference score on the behavioral Stroop task was nearly identical to 
that reported elsewhere in similar populations (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000), supporting our interpretation that the new version of the task used in this 
experiment controlled for the use of response strategies reported by some participants in 
Experiment 1. 
 
3.2.4. Associations with measures of education 
The composite science education variable (M = 2.32, SD = 1.08) did not correlate 
with interference scores for the science items, either in terms of accuracy (analyzed 
separately in the time limit and no time limit conditions) or response time (analyzed in the no 
time limit condition), both ps = n.s. 
Because both religious education variables were strongly skewed, Spearman’s rank-
order correlations were used instead of Pearson’s correlations. For religion items, neither 
church attendance nor theology study predicted interference scores for either accuracy 
(analyzed separately in the time limit and no time limit conditions) or response time 
(analyzed in the no time limit condition); all ps = n.s. However, for consistent and 
                                                 
22 Seven participants did not complete the behavioral Stroop task, and 3 participant’s scores were 
removed for being more than 2SD above the mean Stroop response time interference score; 4 participants’ 
scores were removed for being more than 2SD above or below the mean working memory score. 
48 
 
inconsistent religion items in the no time limit condition, church attendance was correlated 
with accuracy (r = .623, p <.001, and r = .483, p <.01, respectively). 
 
4.0. Experiment 3 
 
The primary prediction of the current study, that inconsistent statements would be 
responded to less accurately and more slowly than consistent statements, was supported in 
Experiments 1 and 2. The goal of Experiment 3 was to control for the possibility that this 
pattern was caused by systematic low-level biases in the statements used, rather than by co-
existence and interference of core intuitions on acquired beliefs. For example, processing of 
the inconsistent versus consistent statements within each group might have been more 
difficult due to a systematic syntactic bias which was not controlled for during statement 
construction (e.g. passive versus active, or affirmative versus negative, sentences; e.g., see 
Wason, 1959, for a classic study of response time differences between affirmative and 
negative sentences). Note that although no such systematic low-level biases were identified 
a-priori we nonetheless considered it important to include this control experiment. To test 
this, in a subset of the religion statements in Experiment 3, the supernatural entity “God” was 
replaced with a non-supernatural religious agent (“my priest”). It was predicted that since 
participants hold no acquired beliefs inconsistent with core intuitions about this non-
supernatural agent, there should be no differences in accuracy or response time on the 
modified “inconsistent” and “consistent” statements (these terms were retained for ease of 
comparison). 
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4.1. Method 
 
4.1.1. Participants 
Participants were 37 university students (81% female) ranging in age from 18 to 21 
(M = 19) drawn from the psychology participant pool at the University of California, Santa 
Barbara. All participants received class credit for their time. Thirty eight percent of 
participants identified as White, 24% identified as Hispanic or Latino, 8% identified as black, 
19% identified as Asian, and 11% identified as “Other”. 
Participants were pre-selected according to the same criteria used in Experiment 2 
(see section 3.1.1 for details). Four participants did not match these criteria, despite the initial 
pre-selection, and were therefore not included in the final sample (N = 33). 
Of the final sample thirty percent of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 37% 
identified as non-denominational Christian, and 33% identified as one of a number of 
Protestant Christian denominations (e.g. Methodist, Pentecostal). On a 4-point Likert scale 
(range 0 to 3) participants on average reported being moderately religious (M = 1.85, SD = 
.51) and moderately spiritual (M = 1.61, SD = .70), and the two were highly correlated (r = 
.44, p = .01). 
 
4.1.2. Design 
As in Experiments 1-2 the primary dependent variable was response accuracy and a 
secondary dependent variable was response time. The design was a 2 (Domain: Religion 
versus Science) x 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) factorial design with 
within-subjects repeated measures. 
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4.1.3. Materials 
A subset of the religion statements (sets T3, T5, T6, T8, and T9; see the 
Supplementary Material) was modified by replacing the word “God” with “my priest”. The 
religion statements modified in this manner were not selected at random, but were selected 
because they could be modified and still remain coherent. For example, a number of 
statements could not be modified because they pertained to God listening to prayers, and 
prayers are directed toward God but not toward priests. Example statements appear in Table 
3. 
The modified religion statements were presented in random order along with the 
remaining unmodified religion statements and the entire set of science statements. No 
measures of executive functions or education were administered in this experiment. 
 
 
 
4.1.4. Procedure 
Table 3
Sample Modified Statements from the Domain of Religion.
Intuition Theology Religion Statements Modified Religion Statements
Consistent
T T God has beliefs that are true. My priest has beliefs that are true.
F F All beliefs God has are false. All beliefs my priest has are false.
Inconsistent
T F God has beliefs that are false. My priest has beliefs that are false.
F T All beliefs God has are true. All beliefs my priest has are true.
Note. The terms "consistent" and "inconsistent" do not apply to the modified religion statements but are used for illustrative 
purposes only. The modified religion statements are true or false according to intuition only.
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The procedure was the same as in Experiments 2, except that all participants were 
assigned to the same unspeeded condition (identical to the unspeeded condition in 
Experiment 2). 
 
4.2. Results 
 
4.2.1. Sentence response accuracy 
A paired-samples t-test revealed no response accuracy difference between the 
modified “consistent” and “inconsistent” religion items (M consistent = 77.30 %, SD consistent = 
15.47%, versus M inconsistent = 73.90%, SD inconsistent = 18.53%; t (32) = .69, p > .5, d = .20). 
Note that the response accuracies for the modified religion items are relatively low. We think 
that this is because in replacing “God” with “my priest” we introduced ambiguity into the 
pragmatic interpretations of some items, which were designed to evaluate beliefs about God 
rather than about priests. For example, the items “my priest knows of various things that 
happened in the past” or “my priest doesn’t know of things that happened in the past” may be 
interpreted as proclamations about knowledge in general, in which case the correct response 
to the first item is “true” and to the second item “false”, because people have at least some 
knowledge of the past. Alternatively, these items may be interpreted as proclamations about 
the priest’s competence, in which case responses to these items are dependent on particular 
priests. In any case, what is critical for our purposes is that items were evaluated relative to 
others in their group – the relevant data are within-group differences between “consistent” 
and “inconsistent” items, not overall accuracy. 
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In contrast, a paired-samples t-test on the unmodified versions of these same items 
(using the “God” rather than “my priest” wording) from the no time limit condition from 
Experiment 2 revealed a response accuracy difference between the consistent and 
inconsistent items [M consistent = 96.60 %, SD consistent = 5.45%, versus M inconsistent = 88.70%, 
SD inconsistent = 13.62%; t (31) = 3.14, p < .01, d = .76]. 
Next, to examine if the main findings from Experiments 1-2 replicated in this 
experiment, the response accuracy data were subjected to a 2 (Domain: Religion versus 
Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) with the unmodified religion items only. The analysis revealed main 
effects of Domain (F 1, 32 = 195.41, p < .001, partial η2 = .86) and Consistency (F 1, 32 = 
307.20, p < .001, partial η2 = .91), qualified by an interaction between Domain and 
Consistency (F 1, 32 = 53.23, p < .001, partial η2 = .62). 
Simple main effect analyses confirmed that as in Experiments 1-2 participants 
performed better on the religion items than on the science items in both the consistent [M 
religion = 97.19%, SD religion = 6.67%, versus M science = 81.61%, SD science = 5.66%; t (32) = 
10.78, p < .001, d = 2.52] and inconsistent conditions [M religion = 85.06%, SD religion = 9.68%, 
versus M science = 57.61%, SD science = 7.82%; t (32) = 13.77, p < .001, d = 3.12]. The 
interaction entailed the size of the effect for consistency being more than twice as large for 
the science items [M consistent = 81.61%, SD consistent = 5.66%, versus M inconsistent = 57.61%, SD 
inconsistent = 7.82%; t (32) = 19.18, p < .001, d = 3.52] than for the religion items [M consistent = 
97.19%, SD consistent = 6.67%, versus M inconsistent = 85.06%, SD inconsistent = 9.68%; t (32) = 
8.83, p < .001, d = 1.46]. 
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4.2.2. Sentence response time23 
Paired-samples t-tests revealed no response time differences on correct responses 
between the modified “consistent” and “inconsistent” items [M consistent = 3770ms, SD consistent 
= 1178ms, versus M inconsistent = 3541ms, SD inconsistent = 992ms; t (32) = .96, p = n.s., d = .21], 
and no response time differences on correct responses on the unmodified versions of these 
same items from the no time limit condition from Experiment 2 [M consistent = 3277ms, SD 
consistent = 693ms, versus M inconsistent = 3364ms, SD inconsistent = 563ms; t (31) = 1.21, p = n.s., d 
= .14]; however, response times on consistent and inconsistent items were in the predicted 
direction for the unmodified items from Experiment 2 (consistent < inconsistent), and in the 
opposite direction for the modified items (consistent > inconsistent). 
Next, to examine if the main findings from Experiments 1-2 replicated in this 
experiment the response time data on correct responses were subjected to a 2 (Domain: 
Religion versus Science) X 2 (Consistency: Consistent versus Inconsistent) repeated 
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the unmodified religion items only. The 
analysis revealed main effects of Domain (F 1, 32 = 7.44, p = .01, partial η2 = .19) and 
Consistency (F 1, 32 = 68.12, p < .001, partial η2 = .68) qualified by an interaction between 
Domain and Consistency (F 1, 32 = 8.36, p < .01, partial η2 = .21). 
Simple main effect analyses revealed that participants were faster on the science than 
on the religion items for consistent items [M science = 2991ms, SD science = 632ms, versus M 
religion = 3284ms, SD religion = 715ms; t (32) = 3.99, p < .001, d = .43], and that there was no 
difference in response times between the science and religion items for inconsistent items [M 
religion = 3576ms, SD religion = 791ms, versus M science = 3538ms, SD science = 779ms; t (32) = 
                                                 
23 A very small number of response time data points (<2%) were removed for being more than 3SD 
above or below the mean response time. 
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.49, p = n.s., d = .05]. The interaction entailed the size of the effect for Consistency being 
nearly twice as large for the science items [M consistent = 2991ms, SD consistent = 632ms, versus 
M inconsistent = 3538ms, SD inconsistent = 779ms; t (32) = 9.19, p < .001, d = .77] than for the 
religion items [M consistent = 3284ms, SD consistent = 715ms, versus M inconsistent = 3576ms, SD 
inconsistent = 791ms; t (32) = 3.91, p < .001, d = .39]. 
  
5.0. General discussion 
 
5.1. Support for the co-existence of inconsistent acquired beliefs and core intuitions 
 
The primary goal of the current study was to test the hypothesis that, in the minds of 
adult religious adherents, acquired Christian beliefs about God co-exist with, rather than 
replace, an initial representation of God formed by co-option of the evolved person concept. 
The experiments reported here utilized a task where participants were required to evaluate 
statements that were true or false according to both core intuitions about persons and 
Christian theology (consistent statements), and statements that were either true intuitively but 
false theologically or false intuitively but true theologically (inconsistent statements). In 
Experiments 1 and 2, participants were less accurate and slower in evaluating inconsistent 
versus consistent statements, thereby demonstrating both co-existence and interference in the 
domain of religion. 
Furthermore, by replicating and expanding on the findings of Shtulman and Valcarcel 
(2012) with earlier- and later-acquired scientific beliefs the current study brings attention to 
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the theoretical parallels in co-existence in the domains of religion and science, which have 
thus far been studied mostly independently. 
In contrast to previous studies purporting to show that adults attribute person 
characteristics to God, the current study controlled for two plausible alternative 
interpretations. According to one, attributing person-like characteristics to God is caused by 
some adults not having acquired the relevant theological doctrines to fully know which 
characteristics God is thought to have. However, the very high performance on inconsistent 
religion statements and near perfect performance on consistent religion statements suggests 
that the acquired beliefs about God examined in this study were known to the participants 
tested (as indeed was predicted, given that the sentences used reflect the most common 
theological beliefs about God – see Section 1.2.). 
Additionally, an examination of response accuracies on individual religion statements 
(see the Supplementary Material) shows that for the most part errors are relatively evenly 
distributed among the different statements. That is, there was a small but reliable probability 
that participants would make an error on any given statement regardless of the characteristic 
the statement pertained to. The alternative whereby participants did not know certain parts of 
the relevant theology predicts clustering of errors around only few statements, for example 
statements pertaining to characteristics of God talked about ambiguously and/or rarely. 
The results also rule out another alternative interpretation of prior results: that 
attributing person-like characteristics to God is caused by some adults intentionally deviating 
from theology (that is, speaking of God metaphorically; see e.g. Luhrmann, 2012). This 
alternative predicts, for correct responses, no difference in response times between consistent 
and inconsistent statements. However, in both conditions of Experiment 1 and in the no time 
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limit condition of Experiment 2, inconsistent religion statements were responded to 
significantly more slowly than consistent religion statements. Additionally, this alternative 
predicts an identical decrease in response accuracies on consistent and inconsistent 
statements when participants respond under time pressure versus no time pressure. But in the 
time limit condition in Experiment 2, response accuracies decreased significantly more for 
inconsistent than for consistent religion statements. 
Finally, by showing that the difference between consistent and inconsistent 
statements disappeared when replacing the term “God” with “my priest” in a subset of the 
statements in Experiment 3, we controlled for the possibility that the findings reported here 
were caused by systematic low-level biases (e.g. syntactic biases) in the statements used 
rather than by co-existence. 
 
5.2. Support for the existence of mechanisms that resolve conflicts between inconsistent 
beliefs 
 
If core intuitions co-exist and interfere with acquired beliefs that are inconsistent with 
them, then certain mechanisms should exist to resolve the interference or conflict created by 
tasks in which both representations are engaged (e.g. Kelemen & Rossett, 2009; Kelemen, 
Rottman, & Seston, 2012; Lindeman, Riekki & Hood, 2011; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). 
A second prediction of the co-existence hypothesis that was tested here is that the effect of 
Consistency on response accuracy will increase when participants are made less able to or 
have less time to resolve conflicts between inconsistent beliefs. 
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In Experiment 2 a subset of participants was assigned to a speeded responding 
condition where a time limit was set on responses, and another subset received the task with 
no such time limit (unspeeded responding condition). The findings demonstrated that when 
participants are made to respond quickly they disproportionately make more errors on 
inconsistent versus consistent religion statements. While this finding does not as yet highlight 
any specific mechanism (also see section 5.3), the effect of cognitive load in the form of time 
pressure does support the prediction that those cognitive mechanisms that resolve conflicts 
between inconsistent beliefs have limited efficiency, and intuitive beliefs are more likely to 
lead to errors in responding when there is less time to resolve conflicts between them and 
acquired beliefs. 
Note that these findings are compatible with, although they do not uniquely support, 
the suggestion by Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009; 
also see Barrett, 1999) and by dual-process theorists (Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; also see Mercier & Sperber, 2011) that acquired beliefs inconsistent with core 
intuitions exist in a specialized representational format or mechanism that is distinct from 
that of intuitive beliefs (see our footnote 2). If this is the case then under cognitive load 
religious adherents are more likely to rely on erroneous intuitive beliefs not only because of a 
limitation of conflict resolution mechanisms, but because intuitive beliefs require 
significantly fewer processing resources than acquired religious beliefs (e.g. executive 
functions: see Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
 
5.3. No correlations with executive inhibition 
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A third prediction derived from the co-existence hypothesis that was tested here was 
that executive inhibition, as indexed by the behavioral Stroop task, is the process that 
resolves the interference or conflict of core intuitions with acquired beliefs. Previous studies 
are equivocal with respect to this question. For example, on the one hand Kelemen and 
Rossett (2009) showed that variance in endorsing teleological explanations was uniquely 
explained with the behavioral Stroop task (ibid, p. 141), and similarly, Svedholm and 
Lindeman (2013) showed that a measure of ontological confusions (argued by these authors 
to be based on intuitions) was strongly correlated with the behavioral Stroop task (albeit 
using a different configuration of task conditions and coding than those used by Kelemen & 
Rossett, 2009). In addition, Zaitchik, Iqbal, and Carey (2014) found evidence that executive 
functions, including inhibition, uniquely explained variance in performance, controlling for 
age and verbal IQ, on a biological reasoning task in 5- to 7-year-old children. The authors 
argue that executive functions are necessary for both the acquisition of beliefs about biology 
at this age range, and for performance on their task in children who have acquired these 
beliefs (this is because to perform accurately on their task children had to resolve a conflict 
between their intuitions about biology and newly acquired biological beliefs). 
On the other hand, Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2012) found no relationship 
between teleological intuitions and the behavioral Stroop task in their study of college 
students, professional scientists, and community members (ibid, p. 1079). 
The results reported here using task conditions and coding similar to those adopted by 
Kelemen and colleagues in Experiment 1, and Svedholm and Lindeman (2013) in 
Experiment 2, repeatedly failed to show a relationship between performance on the sentence 
verification task and the behavioral Stroop task. We think it likely that this failure to find a 
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correlation between performance on the sentence verification task and the behavioral Stroop 
task is due to the fact that executive inhibition can be measured in a variety of ways and, 
more broadly, a range of different executive functions likely jointly contribute to 
performance on complex tasks (e.g. see the latent variable analysis and thorough discussion 
in Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000). In the future, researchers might 
consider the use of a more varied and rigorous battery of inhibitory and other executive 
functions measures. 
 
5.4. No correlations with practice 
 
A final prediction derived from the co-existence hypothesis that was tested here was 
that practice with acquired beliefs would attenuate the effect of interference from inconsistent 
intuitions. Experiment 1 and the time limit condition of Experiment 2 found that regular 
church attendance was positively correlated with accuracy on consistent and inconsistent 
religion items; however, none of the practice measures used correlated with accuracy or 
response time interference scores in either the religion or science domains. The failure to find 
such an effect in the current study parallels that of Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012). In 
contrast, the investigation by Kelemen and Rosset (2009) in a similar population of 
university undergraduates did find a relationship between science education (indexed by 
questionnaires on geoscience and natural selection) and a tendency to make teleological 
errors. 
A different way to evaluate practice with acquired beliefs, which has been used in 
previous studies, is to compare novices with experts (e.g. university undergraduates with 
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professors); however, these studies are equivocal. Goldberg and Thompson-Schill (2009) 
find a smaller bias in preferentially ascribing animacy to animals than to plants in biology 
professors versus undergraduates, but they find similar biases in these groups in, for example, 
preferentially ascribing animacy to moving than to nonmoving artifacts, which are categories 
not studied in biology departments. More recently, Shtulman and Harrington (2016) found, 
using a sentence verification task identical to that of Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012), that the 
accuracy difference between consistent and inconsistent science items was lower in science 
professors (9%) than in humanities professors (13%), and in turn lower in humanities 
professors than in community members of similar ages (20%).  
The findings of Shtulman and Harrington (2016) and Goldberg and Thompson-Schill 
(2009) suggest that practice with acquired beliefs can explain differences in interference, 
albeit within circumscribed domains. On the other hand, while Kelemen, Rottman, and 
Seston (2012) demonstrated that the tendency to make teleological errors was greater in 
undergraduates than in science professors, they did not find such a difference between 
science and humanities professors, which suggests that differences between undergraduates 
and professors other than differences in practice might be responsible for differences in 
interference between these groups (the findings of a difference between humanities 
professors and community members in Shtulman & Harrington, 2016, is compatible with this 
interpretation as well). In the future, researchers might consider the use of more nuanced 
indexes and combinations of multiple indexes to further investigate questions pertaining to 
the effects of practice on interference during co-existence; for instance, both questionnaires 
as in Kelemen and Rosset (2009) and populations that more strongly differ in practice or 
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expertise as in Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2012) and Goldberg and Thompson-Schill 
(2009). 
 
5.5. Implications for theories of religious beliefs and behavior, and future directions 
 
The evidence provided in the current study for the co-existence hypothesis has 
significant implications for foundational theories of the cultural transmission of supernatural 
concepts, including those concepts deemed religious. Boyer’s “cognitive optimum” theory 
(1994a,b, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) postulates that the historical and cross-cultural 
prevalence of specific supernatural beliefs (e.g. beliefs in agents with extraordinary mental 
characteristics) is in part due to a memory and transmission advantage of beliefs that are 
inconsistent with core intuitions (there termed “counter-intuitive” beliefs). The current study 
suggests that, as required by the cognitive optimum theory, conflicts between counter-
intuitive beliefs and core intuitions cannot be permanently resolved, and counter-intuitive 
beliefs may therefore retain their memory and transmission advantage within and between 
individual minds. 
Additionally, the co-existence hypothesis explains two “on-the-ground” observations 
by social scientists and humanists (see Sperber, 1985, for an early discussion of these 
observations under the more general question of why people hold “irrational” beliefs): 
discrepancies between an individual’s reported beliefs, and between reported beliefs and 
behavior (also see Slone, 2004). For example, Christian religious believers often 
simultaneously describe God as person-like (e.g. loving, fallible) and abstract (infallible; not 
describable using human emotion terms). Similarly, although God in Christian theology is 
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all-knowing, believers nonetheless tell Him their prayers (the contradiction, of course, is that 
if God is all-knowing, believers do not need to tell Him anything – He already knows 
everything; for children’s developing understanding of extraordinary communication see 
Lane, Evans, Brink, & Wellman, 2016). Future studies are needed to further investigate the 
“on-the-ground” conditions under which core intuitions versus acquired theological beliefs 
are verbalized, and the variable role of each in regulating religious behavior. 
Finally, while in this study we assumed that the person concept is co-opted to form a 
representation of God (e.g. see Boyer, 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001), at least one other 
hypothesis is potentially compatible with our findings: Bloom (2005) and others (e.g. 
Shtulman, 2008; Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016) hypothesized that the concept co-opted to 
form representations of supernatural agents, including the Christian God, is that of a 
disembodied mind (however, see Hodge, 2008, In Revision). In the current study we did not 
carefully differentiate between different characteristics of God, but post-hoc analyses on 
statements pertaining to God’s physicality versus psychology showed that the reported 
effects held for both (which is compatible with co-option of the person concept and not of a 
disembodied mind concept). However, we hesitate to draw strong conclusions on this 
question, since the current study was not designed to evaluate it. 
In any case, the findings we report regarding co-existence are independent from 
hypotheses about the exact concept that is being co-opted. Future studies are needed to  
investigate a range of interesting specific hypotheses regarding the different possible 
concepts which might be co-opted in representations of God and other supernatural entities in 
both Christianity and other religious traditions – including the possibility of individual 
differences in the concept co-opted for a given supernatural entity (see, for example, the 
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work of Cohen, 2007, 2008, who hypothesized that among believers in the Afro-Brazilian 
syncretic cult Candomblé, representations of certain possessing spirits co-opt the pathogen 
concept). 
In conclusion, beyond providing novel evidence for the co-existence hypothesis in the 
domain of religion, and bringing attention to the theoretical parallels in co-existence in 
religion and science, we aim to highlight the explanatory utility of cognitive science to 
religious phenomena. Recent reviews have disproportionately focused on the present 
limitations of cognitive science in explaining supernatural beliefs and beliefs deemed 
religious (for example, see Purzycki & Willard, 2015, and the commentaries to their article). 
With the current study we aim to reorient focus to the contributions cognitive science can 
make to the study of religion (and culture more broadly) and to possible novel directions of 
empirical and theoretical investigation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Core knowledge intuitions of God as a person are not revised by Christian theology 
despite lifelong experience 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The past few decades of research in cognitive development have revolutionized our 
most basic theories about the ontogeny of concepts. In infancy, domain-specialized learning 
mechanisms scaffold the development of concepts of physical entities and their mechanical 
properties, animate agents and their patterns of self-propelled motion, intentional agents and 
their mental states, natural kinds and their properties, numerosities, and others (Baillargeon, 
Scott, & Bian, 2016; Carey, 2009; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Spelke, 1990). The architecture 
of this reliably developing conceptual repertoire has been designed by natural selection to 
track fitness-relevant features of the environments in which humans evolved. A fundamental 
insight of this view is that our representations of the world are not necessarily veridical – 
rather, organisms of different species carve the world along lines that were relevant for the 
survival and reproduction of the ancestors of that species (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 
2005). 
Beyond this core conceptual repertoire, however, humans have the capacity to acquire 
“evolutionarily new” concepts, or concepts that were not targets of natural selection (Sperber 
& Hirschfeld, 2004, refer to these as concepts that exist within the actual but not proper 
domain of evolved mechanisms): of subatomic particles, of an infinite universe, of geological 
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and evolutionary processes, and of extraordinary beings.24 What is the relationship between 
these concepts and the core conceptual repertoire? We address this question by focusing on 
the case study of the God concept in Christian theology. 
The God concept is formed by co-opting the person concept, a reliably developing set 
of core knowledge intuitions about the physicality, biology, and psychology of persons (see 
Boyer, 2001).25 For example, Lane, Wellman, & Evans (2010) showed that Midwestern U.S. 
children younger than 5 who explicitly attributed constrained knowledge to persons (e.g. 
their mom) on verbal response tasks did so also to God. That is, initially children 
conceptualize God’s knowledge as that of a person. The God concept is then modified to 
represent those characteristics that set God apart from ordinary persons. In Lane et al. (2010), 
children older than five differentiated between persons and God, to whom they attributed 
extraordinary knowledge.26 A question that follows from this is whether the modified God 
concept, which includes characteristics incompatible with the person concept, replaces the 
person representations on which it is initially formed (see Barret, 1999; Barret & Keil, 1996; 
Boyer, 2001). 
                                                 
24 A debate in the literature concerns whether natural selection shaped our minds to represent concepts 
of extraordinary beings. Notably, Norenzayan (2013) argues that representations of omniscient and moralizing 
gods were culturally and perhaps genetically selected to promote cooperation in large groups. A full discussion 
of this debate is beyond the scope of this article, but we consider the by-product view, most notably advanced 
by Boyer (2001), more likely. See for example Baumard, Hyafil, Morris, and Boyer (2015) for a cogent critique 
of Norenzayan (2013). 
 
25 We use the term “core knowledge intuitions” throughout this manuscript to capture our view that it 
is the output of such cognitive mechanisms that is responsible for the initial person representation of 
extraordinary supernatural entities. For brevity, we also use this term to capture representations in the domain of 
science (see e.g. pp. 6-7), though it is important to note that the status of these representations is less precisely 
captured by this term. In the domain of science initial core knowledge intuitions are elaborated into what may 
be thought of as “naïve” scientific beliefs, which develop reliably and early but which are not necessarily 
directly the output of core knowledge mechanisms. 
 
26 See Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, and Young (2016) for a recent review of children’s representation of the 
psychology of God. 
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Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (2017) found evidence that later-acquired Christian 
theological representations of God do not replace initial person representations of God, but 
rather co-exist alongside them. In three studies young adult Christian religious adherents 
evaluated as true or false statements in which their formal theology about God and intuitions 
about persons were consistent or inconsistent. If initial person representations of God are 
replaced by later-acquired representations, then accuracy and response time should be 
independent of consistency with intuitions about persons. For example, statements like “God 
has beliefs that are true” (true according to both intuition and theology) and “all beliefs God 
has are false” (false according to both), should be responded to with the same accuracy and 
time as statements like “God has beliefs that are false” (false theologically but true 
intuitively) and “all beliefs God has are true” (true theologically but false intuitively). 
However, if initial person representations of God co-exist with later-acquired representations, 
then they might interfere with them. Indeed, participants in Barlev et al. (2017) made more 
theological errors and were slower when evaluating inconsistent as compared to consistent 
statements (see Chapter 2). 
Lane, Wellman, and Evans (2014) suggest that a full understanding of extraordinary 
characteristics such as omniscience develops slowly. In their Experiment 1, participants 
varying in age (3-5, 6-12, and 18-21) were introduced to an agent (Mr. or Ms. Smart) who 
“knows everything about everything” and were asked six questions about this agent’s mental 
states (e.g. “Does Mr./Ms. Smart know what you’re thinking right now?”). Only 16% of the 
youngest participants attributed full omniscience to Mr./Ms. Smart (“yes” answers to all six 
questions about the breadth and depth of omniscience, i.e. knowledge of all domains, and all 
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knowledge within a specific domain), while 63% (statistically not different from chance 
performance) and 83% of participants in the middle and older groups, respectively, did so. 
Since a full understanding of omniscience, and possibly of other extraordinary 
characteristics, develops slowly, it is possible that the young adult participants in Barlev et al. 
(2017) had not yet acquired a full understanding of God’s omniscience, omnipresence, and 
incorporeality, or had not had enough experience with it for it to fully replace their initial 
understanding of God. The present study aims to expand on Barlev et al. (2017) by searching 
for behavioral signatures of representational co-existence in a sample of Christian religious 
adherents that varies in theological experience, as indexed by age. 
While there are no prior studies of representational co-existence in the God concept 
of older adults, recent studies of older adults show evidence of co-existence in science 
concepts. Shtulman and Harrington (2016) presented adult participants varying in age with 
statements where naïve and scientific theories were consistent (i.e. true according to both, or 
false according to both) or inconsistent (i.e. true naively but false scientifically, or false 
naively but true scientifically). Both younger and older adults made more scientific errors 
and were slower responding to inconsistent statements (e.g. “the earth revolves around the 
sun” which is scientifically true but intuitively false) as compared to consistent statements 
(e.g. “the moon revolves around the earth” which is scientifically true but intuitively false). 
In the present study, the full set of science items used by Shtulman and Harrington (2016) are 
embedded among the religion items for comparison. 
The present study aims to answer two primary questions: 
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(1) Are initial representations of God as a person replaced by acquired Christian 
representations of an omniscient, omnipresent, and incorporeal God in participants with 
extensive maturation and/or theological experience?  
(2) If initial representations of God as a person are not replaced (indeed, if they are 
not replaceable), does maturation and/or theological experience attenuate conflict between 
them and acquired Christian representations of God? 
We additionally aim to answer two secondary questions concerning individual 
differences in religious expertise and executive functions. We present these in the 
Supplementary Materials. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited from Christian churches in Southern California. 
Participants27 (N = 67; 24 males) ranged in age from 18 to 87 (M age = 46, SD age = 24); 
approximately 30% of participants were 18 to 21 (owing to the proximity of some of these 
churches to a university), approximately 45% were between 22 and 64, and approximately 
25% were 65 and older. Sixty percent of participants identified as White, 19% identified as 
Hispanic or Latino, 15% identified as East Asian, and 6% identified with another ethnicity or 
background. 
                                                 
27 Nine participants were excluded from this final sample: 2 for identifying as atheist or agnostic, 3 for 
identifying with non-Christian religions, 1 for identifying as a Christadelphian, which is a Christian 
denomination with non-mainstream theological doctrines (e.g. nontrinitarianism), 1 for experimenter failure to 
record religious affiliation, and 2 for participant failure to follow instructions on the sentence verification task. 
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Eighty-two percent of participants identified as Roman Catholic, 8% identified as 
Episcopalian, and the remaining 10% identified with a variety of other mainstream Protestant 
denominations. The majority of participants (96%) reported growing up with a mainstream 
Christian religion (with the remainder reporting growing up without a religion but of having 
been affiliated with their present religion for many – up to 45 – years); 76% currently 
identified with the religion with which they grew up, with 82% of participants currently 
identifying as Catholic having also grown up as Catholic. Eighty-five percent of participants 
identified as moderately or very religious (M religiosity = 2.27, SD religiosity = .75; 0 = Not at all, 
1 = Slightly, 2 = Moderately, 3 = Highly), 90% of participants identified as moderately or 
very spiritual (M spirituality = 2.46, SD spirituality = .68), and the two were strongly correlated (r 
(65) = .44, p < .001). 
 
2.2. Design 
The dependent variables were the magnitude of interference between consistent and 
inconsistent statements, calculated for both accuracy and response time, for each of the two 
domains (religion and science) in a repeated-measures design. Theological experience was 
indexed by age, which was coded as a between-subjects factor in two separate ways: 
dichotomized to create a two-level between-subjects age factor (Older versus Younger), and 
tertilized to create a three-level between-subjects age factor (Older versus Middle versus 
Younger). Finally, age was also analyzed continuously in a linear regression.  
 
2.3. Materials 
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The religion statements (n = 48), pertaining to doctrines about the physical and 
psychological characteristics of God in mainstream Christian theology, were from Barlev et 
al. (2017). Statements were constructed in quartets, with each quartet pertaining to a 
particular theological doctrine (e.g. infallibility). In each quartet there was a pair of 
consistent statements (true according to both intuitions about persons and Christian theology 
about God, or false according to both) and a pair of inconsistent statements (true intuitively 
but false theologically, or false intuitively but true theologically). See Table 3.1 for 
examples. 
The science statements (n = 200), pertaining to theories about 10 areas of 
mathematics and science (astronomy, evolution, fractions, genetics, germs, matter, 
mechanics, physiology, thermodynamics, and waves), were from Shtulman and Harrington 
(2016), and were similarly constructed. See Table 2 for examples. 
 
 
Table 1
Sample Statements from the Domain of Religion.
Consistency Intuition Theology Religion Statements
Consistent T T God has beliefs that are true.
F F All beliefs God has are false.
Inconsistent T F God has beliefs that are false.
F T All beliefs God has are true.
Consistent T T God can hear what I say out loud.
F F God can't hear what I say out loud.
Inconsistent T F God can't hear what I say to myself.
F T God can hear what I say to myself.
Consistent T T God can be present at my church and at other churches as well.
F F God is never present at my church, nor is He present anywhere else.
Inconsistent T F Sometimes God is at my church, and sometimes He is at other churches.
F T God is at all times both at my church and at other churches.
Note. Consistent satements are true on both intuition and theology; inconsistent statements are true on one and false on the other. Statements are 
from Barlev et al. (2016).
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Thus, within each quartet there were two true and two false statements according to 
religion or science. The four statements within each quartet were further balanced in terms of 
overall sentence structure, complexity, and length in words. The full list of statements can be 
found in the Supplementary Materials. 
On the Sentence Verification Task, accuracy interference was calculated by 
subtracting the mean accuracy on inconsistent statements from the mean accuracy on 
consistent statements, and response time interference was calculated by subtracting the 
mean response time on consistent statements from the mean response time on inconsistent 
statements. Thus, for both accuracy and response time, performance on consistent statements 
was a baseline with which performance on inconsistent statements was compared; higher 
Table 2
Sample Statements from the Domain of Science.
Consistency Intuition Science Science Statements
Consistent T T Rocks are composed of matter.
F F Numbers are composed of matter.
Inconsistent T F Fire is composed of matter.
F T Air is composed of matter.
Consistent T T People turn food into energy.
F F Rocks turn food into energy.
Inconsistent T F Plants turn food into energy.
F T Bacteria turn food into energy.
Consistent T T Humans are descended from tree-dwelling creatures.
F F Humans are descended from plants.
Inconsistent T F Humans are descended from chimpanzees.
F T Humans are descended from sea-dwelling creatures.
Note. Consistent satements are true on both intuition and science; inconsistent statements are true on one and false on the other. Statements are 
from Shtulman and Valcarcel (2012).
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accuracy and response time interference scores indicate poorer performance on inconsistent 
versus consistent statements. 
Additionally, participants took a survey which included demographic questions, and 
the following indices of explicit beliefs about God: “Do you believe that God is physical in 
the same manner humans are physical?” (Yes/No/Unsure), “Do you believe God has feelings 
and thoughts in the same manner humans have feelings and thoughts?” (Yes/No/Unsure).28 
 
2.4. Procedure 
Participants were tested in semi-private computer stations in an experimental 
psychology laboratory (87%), or on laptop computers in a quiet side-room of their church 
(13%). A typical study session lasted between 30 and 60 minutes, but with up to 120 minutes 
for the older participants who were generally slower on all parts of the study; participants 
received $20.  
The sentence verification task items were presented one-by-one and in a randomized 
order, and whether the right or left hand was used to respond “true” or “false” was 
randomized between participants. The instructions to the sentence verification task 
emphasized accuracy but not response time, and responses were collected via key presses 
(presented via E-Prime software). 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
The analyses presented here use accuracy and response time interference scores. See 
Supplementary Materials for pirate plots of consistent and inconsistent items separately. The 
                                                 
28 These questions were added to the experiment after it had started, and data on these questions is 
therefore missing for 17 participants. 
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data used in the analyses presented here were manipulated by removing data points above or 
below 3 SD from each participants’ mean response time, separately on consistent and 
inconsistent religion and science items; less than 2% of data points were removed in this 
way. Additionally, to maximize transparency, we present both response time data computed 
from correct responses only (as in Barlev et al., 2017), and from correct and incorrect 
responses. Lastly, following the recommendation by Steegen, Tuerlinckx, Gelman, and 
Vanpaemel (2016), we present a multiverse analysis exploring different outlier removal 
strategies. The overall conclusions of the present study remain the same with all outlier 
removal strategies explored, including the strategy of not removing outliers at all. 
 
3.1. Response interference is evident in older adults 
We first tested for response interference in the full sample, and then, to evaluate 
whether response interference exists in older adults, in the sample dichotomized and 
tertilized by age. The dichotomized sample was comprised of two groups: 18- to 45-year-olds 
(n = 34) and 46- to 87-year-olds (n = 33), and the tertilized sample was comprised of three 
groups: 18- to 25-year-olds (n = 22), 26- to 60-year-olds (n = 23), and 62- to 87-year-olds (n 
= 22). The accuracy and response time differences were analyzed using one-sample t-tests. 
Table 3 presents the results of these analyses, and Tables 4a-b in the Appendix present a 
multiverse analysis. 
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In the full sample, religion and science response interference was evident from both 
accuracy and response time differences between consistent and inconsistent items. In the 
dichotomized and tertilized samples, religion response interference was fully evident in the 
older group, and partially evident in the younger group (dichotomized sample) and in the 
younger and middle groups (tertilized sample), where response time differences achieved 
marginal statistical significance when computed with correct and incorrect responses, but did 
not achieve statistical significance when computed with correct responses only. In both the 
dichotomized and tertilized samples, science response interference was fully evident in all 
groups. 
 
3.2. Response interference is invariant with maturation and theological experience 
A series of Bayesian linear regressions (computed using JASP 0.8.1.2.) were used to 
evaluate the relationship between theological experience and response interference, using age 
(our index of experience) as a continuous predictor. Since a plausible hypothesis considered 
in the present analysis is the null, Bayes factors showing support for the null versus the 
alternative were computed (with priors set to the default in JASP 0.8.1.2. which is r = .354). 
Table 3
Response Accuracy (ACC) and Time (RT) Interference Scores Throughout Adulthood.
Religion ACC
RT ¹
RT ²
Science ACC
RT ¹
RT ²
Full Sample Dichotomized Tertiarized
196ms
20% ***
394ms ᶧ 698ms *
840ms ***
7% ***
308ms **
20% ***
1039ms ***
7% *** 7% ***
152ms 469ms **
20% *** 21% ***
459ms *** 260ms ᶧ 663ms *** 287ms ᶧ
916ms *** 1366ms ***
Younger Older Younger Middle Older
8% *** 6% **
231ms 500ms **
19% *** 22% ***
887ms *** 1194ms ***
7% ***
1076ms ***
Note.  Interference scores are computed as consistent minus inconsistent for response accuracy, and inconsistent minus consistent for response time. RT ¹ are computed with correct responses. RT ² are 
computed with correct and incorrect responses. *** p  < .001. ** p  < .01. * p < .05. ᶧ p < .10.
866ms *** 742ms *** 993ms *** 704ms *** 819ms ***
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The Bayes Factors in support of the null hypothesis that religion and science accuracy 
interference scores did not vary with age were 3.91, and 3.63 (both moderate evidence in 
support of the null). The Bayes Factors in support of the null hypothesis that religion and 
science response time interference scores did not vary with age were 1.39 and 0.67 (which 
support neither hypothesis).29 30 See Tables 5a-b in the Appendix for a multiverse analysis. 
The regressions are displayed in Fig 3.1. 
 
                                                 
29 Since the data reported here are not normally distributed, Bayesian Kendall’s tau coefficients were 
additionally calculated. The tau tests yielded identical conclusions to those reported here using the Bayesian 
regressions. 
 
30 In fact, the trend in the response time interference scores is in the direction opposite to that expected 
under a replacement hypothesis. 
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Fig. 1. Scatterplots of performance on the sentence verification task with age. Circles 
represent participant accuracy (% correct) or response time (milliseconds) interference 
scores. The shaded areas around the regression lines represent the 95% CIs. 
 
Additionally, in our sample there were 3 participants with Master’s degrees in 
Theology, and with decades of experience teaching theology, each in a different setting (a 
religious school, a Youth Ministry, and a church). We viewed these participants as case 
studies of particularly high theological expertise. The religion accuracy interference scores of 
2 of the 3 were in the predicted direction (4%, 8%, and -4%) and all 3 had religion response 
time interference scores in the predicted direction (425ms, 361ms, and 607ms, respectively). 
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3.2. Response interference is invariant with explicit beliefs about God 
As noted above, a full understanding of God’s extraordinary characteristics is difficult 
to acquire. This may mean that some individuals in our sample explicitly believe that some of 
God’s characteristics are quantitatively but not qualitatively different from those of a person. 
For instance, they might represent God’s mental states not as omniscient (“knows everything 
about everything”) but as extensive (“knows very many things about very many things”); an 
85-year-old participant who said that God has feelings and thoughts in the same manner 
humans have feelings and thoughts commented to the experimenter “But billions of times 
more. I can’t imagine what He is like.” Overall, in our sample 18% of participants reported 
believing that God is physical in the manner humans are physical (6% were unsure), and 36% 
reported that God has feelings and thoughts in the same manner humans have feelings and 
thoughts (14% were unsure). 
Thus, is it possible that core knowledge intuitions are replaced only among 
individuals who explicitly believe that God is qualitatively different from a person? A 
categorical explicit beliefs composite variable, indexing the extent to which participants 
explicitly attributed person characteristics to God, was computed as follows: participants 
providing two “no” answers were coded as explicitly believing in an abstract God, 
participants providing two “yes” or “unsure” answers were coded as explicitly believing in a 
person-like God, and participants providing one “no” and one “yes” or “unsure” answers 
were coded as explicitly believing that God is both abstract and person-like (regarding 
different characteristics). The representational co-existence hypothesis predicts that we will 
find evidence of response interference among participants who report explicitly believing in 
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an abstract God. We stacked the cards against this prediction by coding “unsure” along with 
“yes”. The findings reported below are the same if we code “unsure” with “no”. 
One-sample t-tests showed that religion accuracy interference was significantly 
different from zero in all three explicit beliefs groups, and that religion response time 
interference, when computed with correct and incorrect responses, was different from zero in 
one of the three groups (marginal when computed with correct responses only), and 
marginally different in another.31 Thus, response interference is invariant with explicit beliefs 
about God. See Table 6 for a summary.  
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The present study evaluated the hypothesis that intuitions about God as a person co-
exist with acquired Christian theology about God, and are not revised even with maturation 
and extensive theological experience. We indexed representational co-existence with 
                                                 
31 Note that the trend of smallest accuracy and response time interference scores among participants 
who believe in a person-like God is opposite to that expected under a replacement hypothesis. 
Table 6
ACC
RT ¹
RT ²
166ms (1063ms)
Religion Sentence Verification Task Response Accuracy (ACC) and Time (RT) 
Interference Scores Given Different Explicit Beliefs About God
Note. RT ¹ are computed with correct responses. RT ² are computed with correct and incorrect responses. 
*** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. ᶧ p < .10.
469ms (918ms) ᶧ
587ms (968ms) *
Abstract (n = 23)
9% (9%) ***
276ms (697ms) ᶧ
6% (6%) **
512ms (1260ms) ᶧ 185ms (1064ms)
Both (n = 17) Person-like (n = 10)
3% (3%) *
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performance on a task in which participants were asked to evaluate as true or false statements 
for which core intuitions about persons and acquired Christian theology about God were 
consistent (both true or both false) or inconsistent (true on one and false on the other). If the 
intuitions on which initial representations of God are based are replaced by Christian 
theology, then performance should not differ between consistent and inconsistent statements. 
However, if these intuitions are not replaced then they may interfere with Christian theology, 
resulting in worse performance on inconsistent statements. 
First, it was found that Christian religious adherents made more theological errors and 
were slower responding to inconsistent versus consistent statements. Importantly, this 
response pattern was found among older adults when they were examined separately. 
Further, this response pattern was found in participants who reported explicitly believing in 
an abstract God. We can therefore conclude that it is not likely that initial representations of 
God as a person are replaced by Christian theological representations of God as omniscient, 
omnipresent, and incorporeal, even following extensive theological experience – indeed, a 
lifetime of experience. 
Second, performance on the task was invariant with maturation and theological 
experience: age did not attenuate conflict between core intuitions about persons and Christian 
theology about God. The same null findings for age were found for science items. In contrast, 
Shtulman and Harrington (2016) found that, compared to younger adults, older adults in their 
study (community members and university professors) made slightly fewer scientific errors 
but were slightly slower responding to inconsistent versus consistent statements. While this 
response pattern might be due to the effects of scientific experience, it might alternatively be 
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due to a changing response strategy wherein among older adults response time is traded off 
for accuracy (e.g. Starns & Ratcliff, 2010). 
The findings reported here are compatible with the idea that one way in which 
humans form concepts that were not targets of natural selection is by co-opting and 
modifying the conceptual output of mechanisms that are part of our evolved core cognitive 
architecture. In the case of scientific theories, initial theories of the world impede the fluidity 
with which later acquired theories are utilized (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012), even after 
much scientific experience has been accumulated (Shtulman & Harrington, 2016; see 
Shtulman, In Press, for a recent review). The same pattern has been demonstrated here for the 
case of Christian theology about God. We speculate that co-existence with core knowledge 
concepts, and consequent interference from those concepts, is a signature property of 
reasoning about bodies of evolutionarily new knowledge in general. 
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APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3 
 
1. Religious expertise 
 
Previous studies are equivocal on whether expertise with theology or science 
attenuates interference between core knowledge intuitions (or early-acquired beliefs) and 
later-acquired theological doctrines or scientific theories (e.g. Barlev et al., 2017; Goldberg 
& Thompson-Schill, 2009; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 2012; 
Shtulman & Harrington, 2016; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). In the present study one 
additional way in which we measured theological expertise is via the following four items: 
 
 “On average how frequently did you attend church throughout your life?” (At least 
every day; At least a few times a week; At least once every week; At least a few times 
a month; At least once every month; At least a few times a year; At least once every 
year or less) 
 “On average how frequently did you contemplate God throughout your life?” (Not at 
all; A small amount; A moderate amount; A significant amount) 
  “On average how frequently did you study theology (formally or informally, by 
yourself or with others) throughout your life?” (Not at all; A small amount; A 
moderate amount; A significant amount) 
  “Please think about other adults of your religious denomination in your community 
as a point of reference. Compared to them how well versed are you with the theology 
of your religious denomination”? (Significantly less versed; Moderately less versed; 
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Slightly less versed; Approximately the same; Slightly more versed; Moderately more 
versed; Significantly more versed) 
 
The majority of participants (82%) reported having attended church, on average 
throughout their lives, every week or more frequently, with 26% reporting having attended 
church a few times a week or every day. On average, participants reported having 
contemplated God between a moderate and a significant amount throughout their lives (all 
participants reported having contemplated God at least a small amount). On average, 
participants reported having studied theology between a small to a moderate amount, and of 
knowing theology approximately the same to slightly better than other adults of the same 
religious denomination in their community. 
Frequency of theology study was strongly correlated with self-evaluation of 
theological competence (r (48) = .62, p < .001) and with contemplating God (r (48) = .39, p = 
.005; theological competence and contemplating God were also correlated: r (48) = .31, p = 
.029). Church attendance did not strongly correlate with any of these variables (all ps > .05). 
Age did not strongly correlate with any of these variables (all ps > .05). 
 
1.2. Response interference is invariant with individual differences in religious expertise 
The four theological expertise measures were added to the Bayesian linear 
regressions of age on religion accuracy and response time interference scores (see Section 
3.2. of the manuscript), and Bayes factors showing support for the null versus alternative 
were computed. The null hypothesis was slightly to strongly supported for all four variables 
and their interactions; the alternative hypothesis was not supported. A multiverse analysis 
83 
 
confirmed that these findings were invariant to whether response times were computed with 
correct responses only, or with correct and incorrect responses, and to outlier removal 
strategies, including the strategy of not removing outliers. Because of the strong correlations 
between some of the religious expertise variables, each variable was additionally entered into 
the regression by itself. The null hypothesis was still supported over the alternative 
hypothesis for each variable. 
The null findings in the present study among adults varying in age parallel the null 
findings of Barlev et al. (2017) among young adults. We still consider it possible that 
theological expertise attenuates interference between representations that coexist alongside 
and interfere with one another. However, a performance-based measure such as the one used 
in Kelemen and Rosset (2009) may be a more direct index of expertise than the measures 
used in the present study (also see Barlev et al., 2017, and Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). We 
are not aware of existing performance-based measures of theological expertise. We are 
presently developing such a measure and intend to validate and report on it in future. 
 
2. Executive functions 
 
We have previously argued that if core knowledge intuitions co-exist alongside and 
interfere with acquired Christian theology, then certain mechanisms should exist that resolve 
this interference or conflict (Barlev et al., 2017). We investigated here whether executive 
functions may be part of this conflict resolution mechanism, that is, whether individual 
differences in executive functions predict sentence verification task performance. 
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The executive functions measures were: (1) A 144-item behavioral Stroop, which 
included the following three conditions (48 items per condition): color-naming (a string of 
Xs appears in red, blue, green, or yellow color and participants are required to respond to the 
color in which the Xs appear), incongruent (the words RED, BLUE, GREEN, and 
YELLOW appear in a color different than the one they spell and participants are required to 
respond to the color in which the words appear), and word-naming (the words RED, BLUE, 
GREEN, and YELLOW appear in black, and participants are required to respond to the word 
that appears). A Stroop Accuracy Interference Score is calculated by subtracting the mean 
accuracy on the incongruent condition from the mean accuracy on the color-naming 
condition; a Stroop Response Time Interference Score is calculated by subtracting the 
mean response time on the color-naming condition from the mean response time on the 
incongruent condition. Thus, performance on the color-naming condition functions as a 
baseline index of accuracy and response time, with higher scores indicating greater difficulty 
inhibiting, in the incongruent condition, automatically reading the color words. The word-
naming condition functions to discourage a response strategy where participants only attend 
to the color in which a word appears by either directing their gaze to the periphery of the 
display or squinting their eyes, thereby blurring the written words. 
(2) A running span working memory task (Broadway & Engel, 2010). 
All participants had to complete the sentence verification task to be included in the 
study. However, because of the physical health of some of the older participants, those who 
reported difficulties with the behavioral Stroop task and/or the working memory task were 
permitted to omit either or both. Seven participants omitted the behavioral Stroop task, 4 
participants omitted the working memory task, and 11 participants omitted both. 
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2.2. Response interference is mostly invariant with individual differences in executive 
functions 
The behavioral Stroop data were manipulated by removing data points above or 
below 3 SD from each participant’s mean response time, separately on the color-naming, 
incongruent, and word-naming conditions; less than 2% of data points were removed in this 
way. Additionally, to maximize transparency, we present both response time data computed 
from correct and incorrect responses, and correct responses only. Age, the Stroop 
interference scores (accuracy and response time), and the working memory scores (“score” 
and “total”; see Broadway & Engel, 2010 for details), were correlated with the religion and 
science interference scores (accuracy and response time). The correlations are presented in 
Table 3.7. On the behavioral Stroop task, higher interference scores (accuracy or response 
time) indicate worse task performance, while on the working memory task, higher scores 
indicate better task performance. 
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Age was positively correlated with the Stroop interference scores (accuracy and 
response time) and negatively correlated with the working memory scores, such that 
performance on both executive functions measures worsened with age. However, neither the 
religion nor science response interference measures reliably correlated with either the 
behavioral Stroop or working memory measures. 
The mostly null findings in the present study among adults varying in age parallel the 
null findings of Barlev et al. (2017) among young adults. We still maintain that certain 
mechanisms resolve conflict between representations that coexist alongside and interfere 
with one another, such as core knowledge intuitions about persons and acquired Christian 
theology about God. However, inhibition and working memory may have no role, or may 
Table 7
ACC RT ¹ RT ² Score Total
Age .30 * .55 *** .54 *** -.31 * -.36 **
Religion ACC n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. -.24 ᶧ
RT ¹ .27 ᶧ n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
RT ² .28 ᶧ n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Science ACC .28 * n.s. n.s. -.24 ᶧ n.s.
RT ¹ .31 * n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
RT ² n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
Note.  RT ¹ calculated using correct and incorrect responses. RT ² calculated using correct 
responses only. Correlations with significance levels above .1 not shown. *** p < .001. ** p < 
.01. * p < .05. ᶧ p < .1.
Correlations Between Religion and Science Interference Scores and 
Executive Functions
Working MemoryBehavioral Stroop
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only play a minimal role, in resolving these conflicts. See Barlev et al. (2017) for a more 
extensive discussion of this issue. 
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Table 5a
Multiverse Analysis of Age Predicting Response Accuracy Differences
Religion Science Religion Science
No-transformation
None .983 .626 4.00 3.61
± 0.5% .687 .571 3.73 3.48
± 2.5% .687 .644 3.73 3.64
± 2SD .766 .685 3.85 3.72
± 3SD .820 .636 3.91 3.63
Log-transformation
None .983 .626 4.00 3.61
± 0.5% .687 .571 3.73 3.48
± 2.5% .687 .658 3.73 3.67
± 2SD .740 .632 3.81 3.62
± 3SD .994 .551 4.00 3.43
Note . Data were processed with or without transformation, and by removing no 
outliers or by removing outliers using different cut-offs. BF₀₁ are likelihood 
probabilities in favor of the null hypothesis.
p -value BF01
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The mind is more than but not separate from the body: On the default functional 
integration of mind and body representations and the intuitive non-reducibility 
hypothesis 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The belief that there exist beings without physical bodies (e.g. animistic spirits, 
ancestors spirits, angels, demons, and gods) is ubiquitous in present and past religious 
traditions, and is the focus of many: Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian syncretic religion, is 
focused on ritualized interactions with disembodied spirits which can possess human bodies, 
often speaking and acting through them (Cohen, 2007); while usually more peripheral, 
beliefs in spirit possession are found in many other religious traditions (Bourguingnon, 
1968). By contrast, mainstream monotheistic religions focus on a god which is not only 
believed to be disembodied, but unconstrained by physical laws entirely. Conversely, a 
somewhat less common but nonetheless recurrent belief, according to Bloom (2005), is that 
there exist “mind-less” bodies, such as the Golem in Jewish folklore or Haitian zombies. 
What explains the existence of these beliefs, and in the case of disembodied beings, their 
ubiquity? 
Bloom (2005), in Descartes' Baby, advances one highly influential hypothesis. Bloom 
begins with the theory, corroborated over decades of research in cognitive development, that 
there exist evolved and functionally specialized cognitive mechanisms for representing 
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intentional agents and their psychology on the one hand, and bodies and their physicality and 
spatio-temporal mechanics such as continuous motion on the other (e.g. Carey, 2009). For 
example, infants understand that intentional agents have goals (Meltzoff, 1995), expect them 
to behave in accordance with those goals (Woodward, 1998, 1999), and to achieve those 
goals through behavior that is rational (Csibra et al., 1999); infants understand that physical 
entities are cohesive (objects are bounded wholes, and neither separate nor join together), 
spatio-temporally continuous (objects move on a connected path, and two or more objects 
cannot occupy the same space at the same time), and act on each other if and only if they 
come into contact; i.e. objects do not interact at a distance (e.g. Spelke & Van de Walle, 
1993). 
Bloom then posits that as a by-product of the existence of these functionally 
specialized mechanisms, default representations of intentional agents (“minds”) are not 
functionally integrated with, i.e. they are separate from, representations of physical entities 
(“bodies”). Bloom posits that this default “Cartesian dualism” is at the foundation of more 
elaborated beliefs about disembodied beings and “mind-less” bodies (see also Bloom, 2007; 
Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015; 2017; Hood, Gjersoe, & Bloom, 2012; Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & 
Wynn, 2004; Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016; see Baumard & Boyer, 2013, for a more general 
view of intuitions as the foundations of certain religious beliefs). 
In this paper I first explain why with an adaptationist perspective on human cognition 
we should expect mechanisms for representing minds to be functionally integrated with 
mechanisms for representing bodies, not separate from them. Second, I carefully re-evaluate 
key empirical studies purporting to favor intuitive mind-body dualism, including in light of 
recent findings by Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (In Prep) that among Christian religious 
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adherents, God is represented as an embodied person. I advance the hypothesis that while 
mechanisms for representing minds are functionally integrated with mechanisms for 
representing bodies, they are not computationally nor phenomenologically reducible to them. 
I reinterpret some of the studies purporting to favor intuitive mind-body dualism via this 
intuitive non-reducibility hypothesis. Third, I propose that the study by Chudek et al. (2017), 
purporting to favor intuitive mind-body dualism, rather sheds light on two particularly 
interesting and related phenomena – explanatory prioritization and a preference for plausible 
impossibilities over unconvincing possibilities – which warrant their own independent 
investigations. Fourth, I argue that beings such as the Golem and Haitian zombies are not 
represented as mind-less, because physical entities exhibiting the requisite behavioral and/or 
morphological cues are automatically categorized as intentional agents. I conclude with a 
discussion of the cognitive optimum hypothesis (Boyer, 1994a,b; 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 
2001) as an explanation for the ubiquity of beliefs about disembodied beings.  
 
1.1. A prelude on core knowledge, and on why an adaptationist perspective should 
make us skeptical of intuitive mind-body dualism 
The brain consists of reliably developing and functionally specialized mechanisms for 
representing the world (“core knowledge” mechanisms: e.g. Carey, 1985, 2009; Carey & 
Spelke, 1994; Pinker, 1994; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007). The set of mechanisms that evolved for representing physical entities and 
their spatio-temporal motion properties are termed “naïve physics”. A small subset of 
physical entities is capable of self-propelled motion, that is, they have an internal and 
invisible source of energy which, in contrast to most other physical entities, makes them able 
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to move without an external and visible physical cause (e.g. Leslie & Keeble, 1987). Leslie 
(1994) suggests that a specialized mechanism, the “Theory of Bodies” (ToBy) mechanism, 
evolved to categorize physical entities as self-propelled by attributing to them the property of 
“force”. While the motion of all self-propelled biological organisms is non-random, the non-
random motion of a small subset of biological organisms is fitness relevant to humans:  the 
motion of persons and animals (both predators and prey), for example. The “Theory of 
Mind” (ToM) mechanism has evolved to categorize this subset of self-propelled, physical 
entities as “intentional agents” and to explain and predict their non-random motion in terms 
of invisible internal representations, i.e. mental states (Leslie, 1994). Kovacs et al. (2010) 
found evidence of the functioning of this mechanism in infants as young as 7 months (also 
see Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, and Surian, Caldi & Sperber, 2007, for evidence using a 
different experimental paradigm with slightly older infants; Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016, 
for a review). 
Although these mechanisms are functionally specialized, they are generally thought 
of as functionally integrated (e.g. see Leslie, 1994). Luo, Kaufmann, & Baillargeon (2009) 
empirically demonstrated just this with ToBy and naïve physics: in their study, infants age 
5—6.5 months were surprised when an object hidden by a screen disappeared (spatio-
temporal continuity; Exp. 5), when one object seemed to pass through another (solidity; Exp. 
2), and when an unsupported or inadequately supported object remained stable in midair 
(support relations; Exp. 4). Once objects were shown to be self-propelled, infants’ inferences 
about possible and impossible physical events involving them changed. However, this only 
had to do with properties relevant to “force”; infants continued to represent the physicality 
and spatio-temporal motion properties of self-propelled objects. For example, infants were 
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not surprised if self-propelled objects reversed direction while in motion (Exp. 1), remained 
stationary when hit or pulled (Exp. 3), or remained stable in midair when unsupported or 
inadequately supported; but they were surprised if self-propelled objects disappeared when 
hidden by a screen or passed through another object. 
Indeed, the notion of functional integration is a fundamental property of the brain and 
requires further elaboration before I continue. The unit which constitutes a “functionally 
specialized mechanism” is relative because it depends on the adaptive function specified. For 
example, the human visual system evolved for processing electromagnetic radiation in a 
certain range of wavelengths for the adaptive function of constructing a mental representation 
of the surrounding environment. The eyes are a part of the visual system that evolved for 
phototransduction, that is, converting electromagnetic radiation into electrical signals, and 
the proper functioning of the visual system is dependent on the functioning of the eyes, and 
so on (we can break the eyes down into their own specialized subcomponents for, for 
example, collecting, focusing, and transducing light). The visual system can therefore be 
considered a single specialized mechanism, or its distinct units, such as the eyes or the cones, 
can each be considered as different functionally specialized units. However, these 
functionally specialized mechanisms are not functionally separate from each other, but are 
rather functionally integrated for solving the general problem the visual system was designed 
to solve. That is, functional specialization is a relative construct, and importantly, does not 
necessitate functional separation. 
What about the Theory of Mind mechanism? A priori, should we hypothesize it to be 
functionally integrated with naïve physics, and with ToBy?32 Yes. The brain is a behavior 
                                                 
32 By this I mean that the outputs of each mechanism be available as inputs to each other, rather than 
that the inferences internal to each mechanism be accessed by inferences internal to each other. 
97 
 
regulating organ, made out of neural circuits (modules) which were designed by natural 
selection to solve adaptive problems. By “adaptive problems” I mean those cross-
generationally recurrent problems the solution of which increased fitness (survival and 
reproduction) in the ancestral environments in which these modules evolved. A fundamental 
insight of this perspective is that modules evolved to track fitness-relevant properties of our 
ancestral environments. Since persons are physical entities, and the ability to appropriately 
represent persons, including both their physicality and psychology is highly fitness relevant, 
any module which does not by default represent both the physicality and psychology of 
persons is not likely to evolve. That is, we interpret the behavior of intentional agents in 
terms of underlying mental states such as goals, but we should additionally apply the laws of 
physics to these agents because, in order for an agent to achieve its goal, it must interact with 
its physical surroundings, and this interaction is constrained by both the physicality of the 
environment and the agent moving in it and acting on it. Thus, to interpret the motion of an 
agent in terms of its mental states, such as goals, the brain must not only consider those goals 
but also the physical means the agent uses to achieve them. 
 
2. Re-evaluating the evidence for intuitive mind-body dualism 
 
2.1. Re-evaluating findings purporting to show that infants do not represent persons as 
physical entities 
Contrary to the above view wherein naïve physics is functionally integrated with the 
Theory of Mind mechanism, Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004), by focusing on the 
property of spatio-temporally continuity, purport to show that by default 5-month-old infants 
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do not represent persons as physical entities. 33 Note, first, that the Kuhlmeier et al. view is 
hard to reconcile with the view that physical movement is used to decide to shunt 
information to the ToM mechanism (see Leslie, 1994). Second, although Kuhlmeier et al. is 
commonly cited as evidence for intuitive mind-body dualism, it is not at all clear that 
intuitive mind-body dualism predicts that human bodies not be viewed as physical entities 
(see Hodge, 2008, p. 409, for a similar point). 
Kuhlmeier et al. use a violation-of-expectations looking-time paradigm modeled after 
the classic findings of Spelke, Kestenbaum, Simons, Wein (1995). In Exp. 1, 5-month-old 
infants were habituated to video displays in which a box slowly moved the length of a stage 
and behind two spatially separated screens, large enough such that when the box moved 
behind either it was entirely hidden from view. In the continuous motion condition the box 
moved behind the first screen, continued through the space between the two screens, and 
behind and out from the second screen. In the discontinuous motion condition the box moved 
behind the first screen but did not continue through the space between the two screens, 
instead appearing from behind the second screen, giving the illusion that the box disappeared 
behind the first screen and reappeared behind the second. Then, infants watched two test 
displays (order counter-balanced between subjects) where either one or two boxes were 
shown moving on the stage. In Exp. 2 infants were habituated to a similar display, except that 
instead of a box now there was a person walking the length of a stage. Then, again, infants 
watched two test displays where either one or two persons were shown moving on the stage 
(identical twins were used for the two persons display). 
                                                 
33 As summarized by Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey, 2006, p. B2, Kuhlmeier et al. “suggest that for young 
infants, categorization as an intentional agent implies ‘all bets are off’ with respect to the principles that 
characterize core knowledge of naive physics”. 
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Kuhlmeier et al. argue that their data shows that infants apply the principle of 
continuity to boxes, but not to persons. However, consider the Kuhlmeier et al. data 
displayed in Table 4.1. 
 
 
 
Kuhlmeier et al. report repeated measures ANOVAs on the looking time data, but not 
paired samples t-tests. Because computing paired samples t-tests requires raw data for 
calculating differences between matched pairs, I am not able to reanalyze the looking time 
data. I did reanalyze the number of infants looking longer at each outcome using a Bayesian 
binomial test (using JASP v. 0.8.1.2). In Exp. 2, as reported by Kuhlmeier et al., there is no 
difference in looking times between the one person and two persons outcomes in either the 
continuous (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.37) or discontinuous (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.37) motion conditions. However, in 
Exp. 1, contrary to what is reported by Kuhlmeier et al., the expected cross-over interaction 
Table 1
Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004) findings.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
5.61 (3.73)
n = 6 n = 4
7.50 (5.42)
n = 5
n = 5n = 5
8.62 (5.19) 7.58 (3.94)
6.57 (6.62)
n = 5
5.53 (3.80)
n = 1
7.23 (4.19)
One box 
outcome
Two boxes 
outcome
One person 
outcome
Two persons 
outcome
Note . Means and standard deviations are shown in seconds. In each condition (10 subjects), n shows 
the number of infants looking for longer at each of the two outcomes.
Continuous motion 
condition
Discontinuous 
motion condition
n = 9
6.40 (3.91)
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(see Spelke et al., 1995) is not found. In Exp. 1, while looking time is longer toward the two 
boxes outcome than the one box outcome in the continuous motion condition (𝐵𝐹10 = 9.31 or 
p = .021), there is no difference in looking times between the two outcomes in the 
discontinuous motion condition (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.44 or p = .754; the Spelke et al., 1995, finding is 
longer looking time toward the one box outcome than the two boxes outcome).34 Thus, since 
the argument that infants do not represent the physicality of persons is based on negative 
rather than positive results, i.e. it is based on a failure to reject the null in Exp. 2, the failure 
to reject the null in the discontinuous motion condition of Exp. 1 casts doubt on the 
Kuhlmeier et al. data as a whole. 
However, more fundamentally, if ToM and ToBy are functionally integrated, what 
looking time pattern might we expect to find in Exp. 2? Kuhlmeier et al. argue that, in both 
the continuous and discontinuous motion conditions, failure to find a difference in looking 
times between the one person and two persons outcomes will supports the intuitive mind-
body dualism hypothesis. However, if infants do not represent the physicality of persons by 
default, such that persons are able to disappear and reappear without infants finding this 
unexpected, at a minimum, given a low-level perception bias to prefer two things over one 
thing, infants in both the continuous and discontinuous motion conditions should show 
longer looking times at the two-persons outcome than at the one person outcome (indeed, 
Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2004, p. 110, themselves note the existence of this low-level 
perception bias).35 
                                                 
34 See similar critique by Rakison & Cicchino, 2004, pp. 105-6. 
 
35 I was tempted to predict this looking time pattern under a numerical reasoning view, e.g. Wynn, 
1992. However, if we take the position of Kuhlmeier et al. seriously, addition and subtraction of small numbers, 
which is a property of naïve physics (Carey, 2009), is ruled-out by the view that 5-month-old infants do not 
apply naïve physics to persons. 
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What might explain the Kuhlmeier et al. findings, then? Rakison and Cicchino (2004) 
and Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey (2006) argue that Kuhlmeier et al. failed to incorporate 
appropriate controls in their study. Rakison and Cicchino point out that infants have 
difficulty processing both dynamic local cues and global cues, and propose that infants in 
Exp. 2 of Kuhlmeier et al. might have attended to the former (i.e. moving body parts such 
arms and legs) rather than the latter (e.g. continuous versus discontinuous motion paths). 
Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey propose an additional experience-based explanation, pointing out 
that persons often take circuitous paths between two points, for example, leaving via one 
door and coming back via another. 
More recently, Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey (2006) found evidence that 5-month-old 
infants do represent persons as physical entities, focusing on the physicality property of 
solidity rather than continuity. Saxe et al. used as a stimulus a human arm36 (satisfying the 
requirement of Rakison & Cicchino, 2004, regarding minimizing dynamic local cues) which 
was shown moving behind a screen on one side and appearing from its other side. In one set 
of trials the arm seemed to pass through a large wall partially visible from behind the screen, 
while in another set the arm seemed to pass in front of a small wall similarly partially visible. 
Saxe et al. found longer looking times at seeming violations of solidity whether a human arm 
or a toy train were used. (Note that a reanalysis of the number of infants looking longer at 
each of the two sets of trials in the toy train condition, using a Bayesian binomial test, failed 
to reject the null, contrary to what is reported by Saxe et al. Critically, though, this analysis 
did reject the null in the two sets of trials in the human arm condition.) 
                                                 
36 Regarding the appropriateness of using human arms as stimuli, Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2006 note 
that most infant studies of humans as intentional agents use human arms rather than full humans as stimuli, e.g. 
Woodward, 1998. 
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In sum, the weight of the evidence seems to be against the Kuhlmeier et al. 
hypothesis. First, Kuhlmeier et al. is based on a failure to reject the null and is therefore open 
to a variety of critiques (Rakison & Cicchino, 2004; Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2006). In 
particular, that the study only partially replicated Spelke et al. (1995), and that the study as a 
whole failed to incorporate appropriate controls. Second, if infants do not represent the 
physicality of persons by default, we can plausibly predict them to show a looking time 
pattern different than that predicted by Kuhlmeier et al. Third, a more recent study (Saxe et 
al., 2006), which controlled for factors that Kuhlmeier et al. did not, found that 5-month-old 
infants do represent persons as physical entities. 
 
2.2. The non-reducibility of ToM and naïve physics as an alternative to mind-body 
dualism 
I already articulated the adaptationist logic for why ToM should be functionally 
integrated with naïve physics (and with ToBy), however, this does not mean that ToM should 
be reducible to naïve physics (and ToBy). That is, default properties applied to intentional 
agents such as goals should not be reducible to properties applied to self-propelled entities 
(“force”) and inanimate entities, computationally or phenomenologically. For an example of 
functionally integrated mechanisms which are not reducible to one another consider vision 
and touch: Streri and Spelke (1988) showed that, contrary to Piaget (1954), 4-month-old 
infants already integrate input from the visual and tactile systems in their representations of 
physical objects. The systems for processing tactile and visual information are functionally 
specialized and therefore computationally different (the input they take in is different, they 
process this input via different specialized machinery, and their outputs are different), and 
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moreover, their outputs are and phenomenologically different. Thus, while the outputs of the 
visual and tactile systems are integrated, these outputs are not computationally or 
phenomenologically reducible to one other. 
I posit that phenomenological or intuitive non-reducibility is likely a property of 
many different mechanisms, including functionally integrated mechanisms, not limited to but 
including the representation of physical objects via vision and touch, and the representation 
of persons via ToM, ToBy, and naïve physics. 
Importantly, the intuitive non-reducibility of ToM and naïve physics in 
representations of persons is compatible with key studies previously interpreted via intuitive 
mind-body dualism, such as duplication studies modeled after the classic philosophical 
thought experiment by Parfit (1984). Hood, Gjersoe, and Bloom (2012) introduced 5- to 6-
year-olds to a hamster and told the children three physical properties about this hamster (e.g., 
that it had a broken tooth in the back of its mouth where it was not visible). Then, the 
hamster was given three memories (e.g., children showed the hamster pictures they drew). 
The children were then shown a machine consisting of two boxes with flashing lights and 
buzzers, and the hamster seemed to duplicate via this machine (the trick consisted of a hidden 
experimenter and a similar looking hamster). Then, the children were asked about the 
physical properties and memories of the old and new duplicated hamster. While children 
were less likely to attribute both physical properties and memories to the new versus the old 
hamster, they were less likely to respond that the new hamster had the old hamster’s 
memories versus physical properties. That is, memories did not replicate to the same degree 
as physical properties. In a further analysis it was shown that 48% of children did not 
distinguish physical properties and memories, while 52% did, responding that the new 
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hamster had fewer memories than physical properties (no children responded that the new 
hamster had fewer physical properties than memories). 
Recently, Forstmann and Burger, 2015, conceptually replicated and expanded on 
Hood et al. with an adult population, using hypothetical duplication vignettes. Both Hood et 
al. and Forstmann and Burger interpret their findings via intuitive mind-body dualism. 
However, their results are similarly compatible with intuitive non-reducibility. Both 
hypotheses predict that in a duplication scenario (either a display of seeming duplication or a 
hypothetical duplication vignette), intuitions about minds be different from intuitions about 
bodies. Note that I may be cutting the mind-body dualism hypothesis too much slack, 
because arguably if minds and bodies are intuitively separate, and if duplication only 
involves duplicating the physical body, then one should predict that participants in the Hood 
et al. and Forstmann and Burger studies would attribute none of the memories of the old 
hamster to the new duplicate hamster. 
The intuitive non-reducibility hypothesis similarly applies to other evidence 
marshalled on the side of intuitive Cartesian dualism. This includes historical data on the 
differentiation of “mind” and “body” in pre-221 BCE China (Slingerland & Chudek, 2011; 
however, see Klein & Klein, 2012); anecdotal observations, such as the disproportionate 
interest by laypersons and scientists in neuroimaging findings that locate mental processes 
such as memory in the physical brain (where else could these processes be?); infamous “my 
brain made me do it” legal defenses (Gazzaniga, 2005); and, indeed, the mere existence of a 
debate about the mind-brain problem in philosophy (e.g. Nagel, 1974). 
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2.3. Explanatory prioritization, and the probably impossible versus the unconvincingly 
possible 
Chudek, McNamara, Birch, Bloom, and Henrich (2017) showed Canadian children 
and Fijian children and adults (indigenous iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island, Fiji) displays 
involving a pentagon named “Penny”. First, participants were introduced to Penny and 
learned that Penny is an intentional agent with the goal of getting cake. Then, participants 
saw a scene where Penny’s path to the cake was blocked by a wall with a small gap. In one 
condition (the near-eyes condition), Penny moves toward a triangle standing motionless and 
stops. The eyes disappear from the pentagon and reappear on the triangle. The triangle starts 
moving, moving through the gap and toward the cake. In other conditions minor features of 
this display varied, for example in the far-eyes condition (shown to Canadian children only) 
Penny moved away from rather than toward a triangle. Finally, participants are asked to 
“point to Penny”. Chudek et al. found that compared to a baseline condition, Canadian and 
Fijian children, and Fijian adults, were all more likely to point to the triangle than to the 
pentagon in the far-eyes and near-eyes conditions. 
What is going on here? Consider stage magic. The whole point of stage magic is for 
the magician’s tricks to defy the audience’s intuitions about the world: the magician seems to 
levitate, thereby defying intuitions about support relations; he makes other persons or 
physical objects levitate, thereby additionally defying intuitions about contact causality; he 
seems to make persons or inanimate entities disappear and reappear, thereby defying 
intuitions about solidity and spatio-temporal continuity; or he seems to defy intuitions about 
psychology by acquiring information that only exists in the head of an audience member. 
Consider David Copperfield’s levitation trick. What makes this particular trick stand out is 
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that the magician’s assistants seem to pass hoops around the levitating magician so as to 
show the audience that the magician is not held by hidden wires. (In reality the magician is 
held by hidden wires tied to a harness and controlled by a computer, and the hoops do not 
actually pass around him but by a slight-of-hand touch the wires and are then rotated in the 
other direction.). While few adult audience members will readily say that the magician 
somehow defied the laws of physics, most will concede that the magician certainly made it 
seem as if he did. What can we conclude on the basis of this and the findings by Chudek et 
al.? 
First, humans output multiple candidate explanations with associated probabilities for 
a given observation, including but not limited to stage magic and displays that come to be 
interpreted as mind transfer. In fact, this is likely a design feature of many cognitive 
mechanisms. The ToM model proposed by Leslie, Friedman, and German (2004) has at its 
core precisely this process of selection from among a set of candidate mental state 
explanations (see Wertz & German, 2007, 2013, for experimental evidence of this). Second, 
humans do not rule-out candidate explanations which violate physical laws. Note that this 
does not have to be the case, because like the android hosts in the HBO TV series 
Westworld, who are programmed to be unable to perceive anything that hints at the 
artificiality of their world, we could have evolved to be unable to articulate candidate 
explanations that defy our core knowledge intuitions – it is noteworthy that this is not the 
case. Third, by default, humans prioritize certain explanations over others, and perhaps most 
interestingly, humans sometimes prioritize explanations which contradict core knowledge 
intuitions over ones that do not. 
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However—and this is an important take-away—explanations are not separable from 
the observations they purport to explain. The finding that default explanations for stage 
magic, the Chudek et al. displays, or, for that matter, ecstatic motor and verbal behaviors, 
including ecstatic dancing and speaking in voices, that come to be interpreted as spirit 
possession (Cohen, 2007), contradict core knowledge intuitions, does not mean that these 
explanations are common, let alone default. 
Moreover, while participants interpreted the Chudek et al. displays as mind transfers, 
a close examination of the Chudek et al. findings reveals hints that participants were not 
representing the mind transfers as non-physical: Canadian children were more likely to point 
to the triangle than to the pentagon (that is, to interpret the display as mind transfer) in the 
condition where the pentagon moved toward (near-eyes) rather than away from (far-eyes) the 
triangle. However, physical motion should not be computed in these scenario under the view 
wherein minds and mind transfer are represented without physicality information; it should 
be computed under the Leslie (1994; Leslie & Keeble, 1987) view wherein motion is used to 
decide to shunt information to the ToM mechanism (e.g. see Woodward, 1998, for a classic 
demonstration of the link between motion and goal inferences). 
In any case, the above considerations of stage magic and the Chudek et al. study leave 
at least one interesting question outstanding: why should the brain be designed to output 
explanations which contradict core knowledge intuitions, and in fact prioritize them over 
explanations which do not? This design property of the human brain has been known for a 
long time. Aristotle advises writers of fiction that they “prefer a probable impossibility to an 
unconvincing possibility”. As Schulz (2017) put it: “Better for Odysseus to return safely to 
Ithaca with the aid of ghosts, gods, sea nymphs, and a leather bag containing the wind than 
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for his wife, Penelope, to get bored with waiting for him, grow interested in metalworking, 
and abandon domestic life for a career as a blacksmith.”37 
One possibility is that counter-intuitive explanations, at least in the stage magic and 
Chudek et al. examples, are placeholders with predictive potential greater than that of other 
candidate explanations: while David Copperfield is not levitating by defying the laws of 
physics it sure seems like he is, and for purposes of predicting what he can and cannot do, it 
might be most useful to provisionally hold this explanation as true rather than weave a 
tangled alternative.38 I might then, as an audience member, hold this counter-intuitive 
explanation as provisionally true, though unable to incorporate it into my database of beliefs 
as definitively true, while isolating it to this particular observation (this particular instance of 
levitation) rather than generalizing it (“David Copperfield can levitate”) or revising my core 
knowledge intuitions on the basis of it (“all people can levitate” or a broader revision of the 
principle of support relations). Moreover, as predicted by Sperber’s hypothesis of 
metarepresentations as adaptations for learning from others (Sperber, 1996, 1997, 2000), I 
should continue searching for other explanations rather than be satisfied with the counter-
intuitive one. 
 
2.4. Christian religious adherents represent God as an embodied person 
Shtulman and Lindeman (2016) had participants from three samples (Finland, the US, 
and India) attribute properties to God (the Christian God, or, for Hindu Indians, the God that 
                                                 
37 In a similar vein, an unnamed dissertation committee member finds the HBO TV series Game of 
Thrones unconvincing because two protagonists, a brother and sister, have an incestuous relationship, not 
because of the dragons, shadow assassin, humanoid ice warriors, or reanimated dead. 
 
38 Note also that finding these experiences attention grabbing and memorable, as we do, may be 
considered an extension of the Sperber (1996, 1997, 2000) and Boyer (2001) hypotheses, which refer to 
communicated information rather than experiences. 
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is most personally important to them39). The property types were psychological (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, emotions, and perceptions), and physiological (biological processes such 
as growth and reproduction, having bodily organs, the ability to act on the physical world 
such as move material objects, and having physical properties such as height and weight). In 
Exp. 1, Finnish participants were more likely to attribute psychological (53%) than 
physiological (22%) properties to God, but with significant variability within property type: 
for example, only 20-30% attributed God with perceptions, while 50-70% attributed God 
with the ability to act on the physical world. Further, psychological and physiological 
properties mostly clustered separately (with notable exceptions; e.g.,  perceptual properties 
other than seeing and hearing clustered with physiology), suggesting that psychology and 
physiology are in fact two mostly separate dimensions. 
Exp. 2 (US) and 3 (India) replicated and expanded on the above, finding that 
participants were not only more likely to attribute psychological than physiological 
properties to God, they were also faster and more confident in doing so; when denying 
properties the reverse was found, with participants slower and less confident denying 
psychological than physiological properties. Notably, while US and Indian participants did 
not differ in the proportion of psychological properties they attributed to God, Indian 
participants were much more likely to attribute God with physiological properties than US 
participants. In sum, the Shtulman and Lindeman findings suggest that participants are 
mostly viewing God’s psychological and physiological properties differently. But what is the 
cause of this? 
                                                 
39 I will for convenience, despite the existence of many gods in Hindu theology, continue referring to a 
singular Hindu “God”. 
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Shtulman and Lindeman hypothesize that God is intuitively represented via a 
disembodied mind concept, and that the physiological properties some participants attribute 
to God are not part of their intuitive representation of God but rather are learned. (This seems 
like an odd hypothesis because in mainstream Christianity what is learned it is that God lacks 
such properties.) Note that it is not clear whether Shtulman and Lindeman view persons as 
similarly represented via this disembodied mind concept or whether they view the 
disembodied mind concept as distinct from an embodied person concept. In any case, the 
Shtulman and Lindeman findings are similarly compatible with the alternative interpretation 
wherein God is initially represented via an embodied person concept, with the differences 
between property types, and the between-sample differences (Finland and the US versus 
India), explainable by different emphases in formal theologies on God’s different properties. 
Christian theology details in length God’s psychology, primarily God’s belief, 
desires, intentions, morality, and ability to perceive human behavior, but not God’s 
physiology, with the exception of God’s existence and God’s ability to act on the physical 
world. In contrast, in the Hindu pantheon both the psychological and physiological properties 
of many gods are detailed (e.g. the elephant head of Ganesha or the four faces and arms of 
Brahma). The Shtulman and Lindeman findings are precisely compatible with the 
interpretation wherein the differences between psychological and physiological properties 
observed are caused by these theological emphases, as well as the differences between the 
Finnish and US samples on the one hand, and Indian sample on the other. Indeed, since 
people are capable of learning a theology, why shouldn’t we expect them to respond, when 
asked what God is like, more or less congruently with this theology? 
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A close examination of the Shtulman and Lindeman findings further supports this 
interpretation. First, Shtulman and Lindeman compared attributions of psychology and 
physiology to chance (50%) and, except for the Indian sample, participants were less likely 
than chance to attribute physiology to God (in all samples they were more likely than chance 
to attribute psychology to God). However, under a disembodied mind view, why should 
participants attribute physiological properties (e.g. that God has bodily organs or that God 
has weight and height) to God at all? The more appropriate comparison may be to 0%, an 
attribution threshold which all properties seem to pass. 
Second, in Exp. 1, there is an interaction between religiosity and attributions, such 
that the more religious participants are, the larger the difference between their psychological 
and physiological attributions (the same analyses are not reported for Exp. 2). This is 
compatible with the above hypothesis wherein the difference between psychological and 
physiological attributions is caused by a difference in theological emphases. 
Third, in Exp. 2, the speeded block was followed by a block where participants were 
asked to attribute the same properties to God but under un-speeded conditions. While 
attributions between the two blocks were very similar, similarity was higher for psychology 
than for physiology, and further, participants who attributed physiological properties to God 
in the speeded block were more likely to deny them in the un-speeded block than the other 
way around (i.e. to initially deny physiological properties to God and then attribute them). 
The same was not observed for psychological properties. This is predicted by a view wherein 
there is more ambiguity around God’s physiological than psychological properties, but it is 
not predicted by a view wherein God’s physiology (but not psychology) is learned (under this 
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view, the un-speeded condition should yield more physiological attributions than the speeded 
conditions). 
Finally, in Exp. 2, participants wrote open-ended justifications for their attributions. 
Psychological attributions were most commonly rationalized by mentioning God’s properties 
or actions on the world and making further inferences from these (God-based), while 
physiological properties were most commonly rationalized by comparing God to persons 
(person-based). This is predicted by a view wherein Christian and Hindu theologies detail 
God’s psychology and actions on the world more so than god’s physiology. The Shtulman 
and Lindeman view may predict the opposite, wherein physiological properties, if learned, 
would more so than psychological properties have God-based rationalizations. 
In sum, the Shtulman and Lindeman findings, which are used to argue that God is 
represented as a disembodied mind, are similarly if not more compatible with an alternative 
hypothesis wherein God is represented as both an embodied person and via learned theology 
which among both Christians and Hindus emphasizes god’s psychology more so than God’s 
physiology, and emphasizes God’s physiology more so among Hindus than among 
Christians. 
A different way of evaluating how religious adherents represent God, which might 
plausibly bypass some of the difficulties of interpreting the Shtulman and Lindeman findings, 
was recently used by Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (2017, Accepted, In Prep). For 
example, that God has beliefs or information (in Shtulman and Lindeman these are the three 
beliefs questions) is part of formal Christian and Hindu theologies (in Shtulman and 
Lindeman these are attributed to God by 70% of responders in the Finnish sample). But that 
God does not have all information or that God has false information are properties true of 
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persons but false of God, but which were not examined in Shtulman and Lindeman. By 
examining differences in attributions of these nuanced views of God’s beliefs, Barlev et al. 
(2017, Accepted, In Prep) were able to make comparisons within attribution type, and via 
this shed further light on how God is represented in the minds of religious adherents. 
Barlev et al. (2017, Accepted, In Prep) evaluated the hypothesis that in the minds of 
adult Christian religious adherents, representations of God are based on both core knowledge 
intuitions about persons and Christian theology about God. The representational co-existence 
hypothesis specifies that multiple conflicting representations of God are possible: God can 
both be conceptualized as a person and as an abstract being; this hypothesis does not yet take 
a position on whether different representations are implicit versus explicit (more on this 
distinction at the end of this section). Barlev et al. used a sentence verification task where 
participants responded “true” or “false” to statements that were consistent or inconsistent 
between core knowledge intuition about persons and acquired theology about God. For 
example, while infants as young as 7-months represent persons as having false beliefs 
(Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; also see Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005, for evidence with 
15-month-old infants using a different method), the God of Christian theology does not have 
false beliefs. Thus, the statement “God has beliefs that are false” is true based on core 
knowledge intuitions about persons, but false based on Christian theology about God 
(inconsistent), while the statement “God has beliefs that are true” is true based on both 
(consistent). See Table 4.2 for sample items from Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (In 
Prep). 
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The logic of the sentence verification task is that if representations of God in the 
minds of Christian religious adherents are based on core knowledge intuitions about persons 
then these intuitions may interfere with Christian theology about God. Indeed, Barlev et al. 
repeatedly found behavioral evidence for representational interference— worse performance 
on inconsistent versus consistent statements (lower accuracy and higher response time). In 
contrast, if representations of God were solely based on Christian theology about God, then 
performance on inconsistent and consistent statements should have been similar (the terms 
“inconsistent” and “consistent”, which imply two different truth values, only make sense in 
light of the representational co-existence hypothesis). 
Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (In Prep) specifically targeted God’s psychological 
and physical properties. The findings from Exp. 1 of this study are shown in Fig. 4.1-4.2 
below. The figures present accuracy and response time differences between inconsistent and 
Table 2
Sample Religion Statements from Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (In Prep).
Domain Consistency Intuition Theology Item
Psychology: Consistent T T God has true beliefs.
Beliefs F F All God's beliefs are false.
Inconsistent T F God has false beliefs.
F T All God's beliefs are true.
Psychology: Consistent T T God can sometimes see what I'm doing.
Perceptions F F God can never see what I'm doing.
Inconsistent T F Sometimes God can't see what I'm doing.
F T God can always see what I'm doing.
Physicality Consistent T T God can be at my church and at other churches.
F F God is never at my church or at other churches.
Inconsistent T F God is at my church when He is not at other churches.
F T God is at all times at my church and at other churches.
Note. Consistent satements are true on both intuition and theology; inconsistent statements are true on one and false on the other. Statements are adapted from 
Barlev et al. (2017).
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consistent items. Critically, contrary to the hypothesis that God is represented as a 
disembodied person, Christian religious adherents showed worse performance on 
inconsistent versus consistent physicality items, as indexed by lower response accuracy 
(consistent – inconsistent) and higher response time (inconsistent – consistent). 
 
      
 
As a concluding, more speculative note, in the studies by Barlev et al. on 
representational coexistence we tried to stay agnostic about whether different representations 
are implicit versus explicit and on the mechanisms by which different representations are 
held. I wonder, however, whether the intuitive/reflective or implicit/explicit distinctions that 
are commonly used in this literature may be somewhat incoherent when referencing the 
different representations investigated. Shtulman and Lindeman note (e.g. in Exp. 2 when 
discussing the similarity between their speeded and un-speeded blocks) that even under un-
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speeded conditions participants may strongly deviate from formal theology. I interpret this 
and the substantial individual differences in the magnitude of deviations from formal 
theology as a property of the co-existence of multiple, conflicting representations that are not 
distinctly implicit versus explicit or integrated into a fully coherent concept. The behavioral 
indices different tasks yield may be characterized as implicit versus explicit—for example, 
response time is a candidate for an implicit measure—but it is not obvious that 
representations can be characterized as such. Indeed, if formal theology was explicit and 
everything else implicit (whether a disembodied mind or an embodied person concept) then 
we would expect religious adherents to always respond in accordance with theology on 
explicit tasks, including always denying God person-like psychological properties, but this is 
not the case in Shtulman and Lindeman or the studies by Barlev et al. 
 
2.5. On Mind-less Bodies, Intentional Agents, and Autism Spectrum Disorders 
The converse to disembodied beings are mind-less bodies. Bloom (2005) claims that 
beliefs in mind-less bodies such as Haitian zombies and the Golem in Jewish folklore are a 
by-product of default Cartesian dualism. However, here I argue that the Golem and Haitian 
zombies are likely not represented as mind-less bodies at all: only very minimal 
morphological or behavioral cues are required for a physical entity to be categorized as an 
intentional agent, such that the Golem and Haitian zombies are likely attributed with 
intentionality. Moreover, historical and ethnographic evidence does not support the claim 
that the Golem and Haitian zombies are mind-less. 
We automatically categorize physical entities as intentional agents via relatively 
minimal morphological and/or behavioral cues. For example, infants ascribe goals to human 
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hands but not to rods (e.g. Woodward, 1998). The classic study by Heider and Simmel 
(1944) showed that adults ascribe intentionality to geometric figures lacking human 
morphology but exhibiting human behavioral cues. Later studies with adults (Berry, 
Misovich, Kean, & Baron, 1992) and preschool children (Berry & Springer, 1993) confirmed 
that these ascriptions are due to human behavioral cues rather than morphological such as 
size and shape. The minimal behavioral cues required for an entity to be categorized as an 
intentional agent are difficult to isolate in Heider and Simmel. The geometric figures in 
Heider and Simmel displayed several candidate cues: repeated self-generated movement, 
changes in speed and direction of movement, as well as contingent interaction with each 
other and with the inanimate entities onscreen (see also Johnson, Slaughter, & Carey, 1998) 
and dispositional states (see also Kuhlmeier, Wynn, Bloom, 2003). 
A few recent studies by Schlottman and colleagues have addressed what some of 
these minimal behavioral cues are by showing that infants ascribe intentionality to stimuli 
such as a two-dimensional square moving in a non-rigid, rhythmic manner (Schlottman & 
Surian, 1999; Schlottman, Surian, & Ray, 2009; Schlottman & Ray, 2010; also see Michotte, 
1963).40 
A notable exception to the above might be individuals with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder (ASD). Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) argued that ASD individuals may 
have a dysfunctional Theory of Mind mechanism and are unable to represent the mental 
                                                 
40
 The square was displayed moving like a caterpillar with two anchoring points, first expanding half 
its body as it progressed forward, and then contracting the other half. For example, Schlottman and Ray (2010) 
found that 6-month-olds ascribed goals to this pattern of motion, but not to one displaying repeated self-
generated movement or an equivalent amount of deformation but in a direction perpendicular to the direction of 
motion. Interestingly, the authors suggest that rather than responding to abstract behavioral cues, infants have 
innate knowledge of different kinds of biological motion: this two-anchor, caterpillar-like motion is different 
from the human motion infants encounter in their environment, and is therefore not likely to have be learned. 
 
118 
 
states of others via this mechanism (also see Baron-Cohen, 1997). Klin (2000) administered 
the Heider and Simmel (1944) task to high-functioning ASD individuals, finding a 
significant decrease in attributions of mental states to the geometric figures among ASD 
individuals compared to neurotypical individuals; a variety of other deficits in ASD 
individuals strongly suggestive of an absence of intuitive mental state attributions has been 
documented (e.g. Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). 
In any case, given the evidence presented above on the automatic categorization as 
intentional agents (i.e., the attribution of minds) of physical entities exhibiting the requisite 
behavioral or morphological cues, it is highly unlikely that neurotypical individuals 
categorize entities such as Haitian zombies and the Golem as mind-less. Rather, as suggested 
by ethnographic findings, these entities are attributed with intentionality, albeit perhaps a 
subservient one. For example, in Davis (2010) Haitian zombies are not described as mind-
less, but as subservient to their masters; they are still able to fulfill tasks assigned to them, 
that is, they can still act to achieve specific goals, even if the goals are their masters’. The 
Golem in Jewish folklore is similarly described as created by Rabbi Loew with the specific 
goal of protecting the Jews of Prague; problems arise when the actions the Golem takes to 
achieve this goal become destructive. 
 
3. Discussion 
 
The present paper lays out a deflationary view of the intuitive mind-body dualism 
hypothesis (e.g. Bloom, 2005, 2007; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2017), and the hypothesis that it 
is this intuition that is at the heart of more elaborated beliefs in disembodied beings (e.g., 
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possessing spirits, the Christian God) and mind-less bodies. Indeed, the present paper argues 
that, contra (Bloom, 2005), mind-less bodies such as the Golem in Jewish folklore and 
Haitian zombies are not represented as mind-less at all. Instead, the present paper advances 
the non-reducibility hypothesis, according to which minds are more than, but not separate 
from, bodies. That is, in representations of persons, ToM and naïve physics (and ToBy) are 
functionally integrated with one another, but the outputs of these mechanisms are not 
representationally or phenomenologically reducible to one other. Note that while my concern 
here was with the non-reducibility of ToM and naïve physics, intuitive or phenomenological 
non-reducibility is likely a property of many different mechanisms, including functionally 
integrated ones (representational non-reducibility is implied by the notion of functional 
specialization). 
In light of the above, how, then, is the cross-cultural and historical ubiquity of beliefs 
in disembodied beings explained? A partial answer is given by the cognitive optimum 
hypothesis: Boyer (1994a,b; 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) proposed that beliefs in 
disembodied beings are cultural attractors – that is, transmitted cultural representations across 
different human groups converge on these beliefs – because they are inconsistent with core 
knowledge intuitions. Note that while intuitive Cartesian dualism suggests that beliefs in 
disembodied beings are ubiquitous because they’re natural, the cognitive optimum theory 
suggests that they are ubiquitous exactly because they are un-natural.  
Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 1996, 1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009 
theorized that acquired information that is inconsistent with preexisting beliefs (stored in a 
so-called database of beliefs) is quarantined in a specialized meta-representational “bubble”. 
For example, the statement “there are millions of suns in the universe”, learned by a child 
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who understands the term “Sun” to be a proper name for our Sun, will hold this information 
in her meta-representation mechanism until it can be reconciled with her preexisting beliefs. 
In this case, it might occur by revising these preexisting beliefs. The child might learn the 
distinction between a planet and a star, that a sun is a star at the center of a planetary system, 
not solely our planetary system, and that “sun” can refer to any of those stars (Sperber, 
1997). According to Sperber and colleagues, when information is held in the meta-
representation mechanism we preferentially attend to and remember this information, and are 
motivated to talk about it with others so as to collect more information about it, so as to 
reconcile it with our preexisting beliefs. In the process of talking about it we transmit it 
broadly. 
However, what if the statement the child learns is “the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Ghost are one”? In this case, Sperber (1997) argues, this information is inconsistent with core 
knowledge intuitions, and since these cannot be revised the learned information and core 
knowledge intuitions cannot be reconciled. The learned information (“the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Ghost are one”) thus maintains its preferential transmission potential, spreading 
more broadly than information that becomes incorporated into the database of beliefs. 
Boyer points out that many religious concepts, concepts about disembodied beings 
included (e.g. the Christian God), are inconsistent with core knowledge intuitions and are 
therefore cultural attractors in this way. For example, the omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, and incorporeal God of Christian theology activates a person concept (thereby 
supporting many inferences about God), but is inconsistent with core knowledge intuitions 
about the psychology, biology, and/or physicality of persons.41 Thus, out of the possible set 
                                                 
41 A further prediction of the cognitive optimum theory is that religious concepts will be minimally 
counter-intuitive, that is, that they will not contain too many inconsistencies with core knowledge intuitions. 
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of religious concepts which could exist across different human groups, only a relatively 
circumscribed set actually does exist, and the cognitive optimum hypothesis at least partially 
explains this historical and cross-cultural similarity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The Christian God concept does not seem to fit this prediction. Why? First, it is important to distinguish 
between the concept as it is represented in formal theology, and the concept as it is represented in human minds, 
the latter showing fewer inconsistencies with core knowledge than the former (e.g. Barlev et al., 2017; 
Accepted, In Prep). Second, this prediction is motivated by a consideration of the limits of human memory – 
that a concept with too many features that need to be held in the meta-representation mechanism will be easier 
to forget (it is not clear from Boyer’s hypothesis whether the entire concept or only certain features will be 
forgotten). But with the advent of public representation technologies such as writing it is possible to form 
concepts which, at least as they are publically represented, are no longer merely minimally counter-intuitive.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Christian religious adherents represent God as an embodied person, not a disembodied 
mind 
 
1. Introduction 
The hypothesis advanced by Bloom (2005) in Descartes' Baby, which has become 
quite influential in cognitive developmental psychology and in the psychology of religion, 
posits that mechanisms for representing the mental states of intentional agents on the one 
hand, and physical entities and their spatio-temporal properties on the other, are not 
functionally integrated. As a consequence, it posits, persons are intuitively represented as 
disembodied minds (also see e.g. Bloom, 2007; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015; 2017; Hood, 
Gjersoe, & Bloom, 2012; Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn, 2004; Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016). 
Bloom further proposes that around these dualistic intuitions form more elaborated beliefs, 
such as beliefs about disembodied beings like animistic spirits, ancestor spirits, possessing 
spirits, demons, and gods, and therein is the cross-cultural and historical ubiquity of these 
beliefs. 
I critically evaluated the intuitive mind-body dualism hypothesis and empirical 
evidence purporting to support it in the previous chapter, so I will do so here only briefly. 
First, there are serious problems with the study by Kuhlmeier, Bloom, and Wynn (2004) 
purporting to show that infants do not intuitively represent persons as physical entities. 
Critically, Kuhlmeier et al. did not control for a variety of alternative explanations for their 
findings (see Rakison & Cicchino, 2004, and Saxe, Tzelnic, & Carey, 2006), including the 
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straightforward possibility of a false negative (the argument in Kuhlmeier et al. is based on a 
failure to reject the null). A more controlled study by Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey (2006) found 
that infants do intuitively represent persons as physical entities. 
Second, a recent study by Chudek, McNamara, Birch, Bloom, and Henrich (2017) 
purporting to show that children and adults find it intuitive that minds can move from body to 
body is better understood as showing that, under certain conditions, events are explained as 
mind transfer events; however, this does not mean that mind transfer is intuitive, only that 
under certain conditions it is prioritized over other candidate explanations. I illustrated this in 
the previous chapter using the example of stage magic. The whole point of stage magic is to 
provoke in the minds of audience members explanations for observed events which are 
incompatible with core knowledge intuitions; indeed, in stage magic we could find examples 
of events incompatible with every documented core knowledge intuition, including about 
physical entities and their spatio-temporal mechanics, and about the addition and subtraction 
of small numbers of objects (e.g. Wynn, 1992). However, we should not on these grounds 
overturn our theory of core knowledge (or of the physicality of persons); rather, this 
phenomenon of explanatory prioritization, already documented for mental state attributions 
(Wertz & German, 2007, 2012; also see Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), should be 
studied in its own right. 
Third, the studies by Forstmann and Burgmer (2015; 2017), Hood, Gjersoe, and 
Bloom (2012), and others (e.g. Cohen & Barrett, 2008a,b; Cohen, Burdett, Knight, & Barrett, 
2011), purporting to show that minds are intuitively conceptualized as separate from bodies 
are better understood as showing that minds are intuitively conceptualized as more than or as 
non-reducible to bodies, but still functionally integrated with bodies. I extensively discussed 
124 
 
this alternative, which I termed the intuitive non-reducibility hypothesis, in the previous 
chapter. I additionally articulated the adaptationist logic that I propose underlies our evolved 
person concept, which coheres with the intuitive non-reducibility hypothesis but not with 
mind-body dualism. 
The aim of the present study is to experimentally evaluate the mind-body dualism 
hypothesis, in part in light of recent findings by Shtulman and Lindeman (2016). Shtulman 
and Lindeman found that participants were more likely to attribute psychological rather than 
physiological characteristics to God (Exp. 1-3) and were faster and more confident doing so 
(Exp. 2-3). Shtulman and Lindeman concluded on the basis of this that in adults, 
representations of God are not based on an embodied person concept, but on a disembodied 
mind concept. However, if we consider that formal theology emphasizes God’s 
psychological characteristics more so than God’s physiological characteristics, why should 
we expect psychological and physiological characteristics to be attributed to God equally? 
The Shtulman and Lindeman findings may be better interpreted via the representational co-
existence of acquired formal theology and core knowledge intuitions about embodied persons 
(Barlev, Mermelstein, & German, 2017; Under Review; Shtulman & Harrington, 2016; 
Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). 
Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (2017; Under Review) evaluated the hypothesis 
that in the minds of adult Christian religious adherents, representations of God based on core 
knowledge intuitions about persons, specifically person psychology, co-exist alongside 
acquired theology about God. Barlev et al. used a sentence verification task where 
participants responded “true” or “false” to statements that were consistent or inconsistent 
between core knowledge intuition about persons and acquired theology about God. For 
125 
 
example, while infants as young as 7-months represent persons as having false beliefs 
(Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; also see Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; for evidence with 
15-month-old infants using a different method), the God of Christian theology does not have 
false beliefs; thus, the statement “God has beliefs that are false” is true based on core 
knowledge intuitions about persons, but false based on acquired theology about God 
(inconsistent), while the statement “God has beliefs that are true” is true based on both 
(consistent). 
The logic of the sentence verification task is that if representations of God in the 
minds of Christian religious adherents are based on core knowledge intuitions about persons 
then these intuitions may interfere with acquired Christian theology about God. Barlev et al. 
(2017) found behavioral evidence for this representational interference: worse performance 
on inconsistent versus consistent statement (lower accuracy and slower response time). In 
contrast, if representations of God were solely based on acquired theology about God (that is, 
if core knowledge intuitions did not exist or were not used to form the God concept), then 
performance on inconsistent and consistent statements should have been similar. 
The present study uses the same sentence verification task as Barlev et al. but with the 
addition of statements that target God’s physicality. The primary question the present study 
aims to answer is whether the Christian God is represented as an embodied person (as 
opposed to a disembodied mind). If God is represented as an embodied person, then Christian 
religious adherents will show representational interference on statements targeting God’s 
physicality (as well as psychology), with lower accuracy and slower response times when 
acquired Christian theology and core knowledge intuitions about embodied persons are 
inconsistent versus consistent. 
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The present study additionally aims to answer the following secondary question: is 
response interference magnified under cognitive load? The findings of Barlev et al. (Exp. 2) 
regarding this question were inconclusive. Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 1996, 
1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009) hypothesized that acquired representations that are 
inconsistent with core knowledge intuitions are quarantined in a specialized meta-
representational “bubble”. In contrast to core knowledge intuitions, which can be accessed 
unconsciously and spontaneously, meta-representations can only be accessed consciously 
(for a related discussion of dual-process theory, see Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 
2013; also see Mercier & Sperber, 2011). The hypothesis of Sperber and colleagues predicts 
that the utilization of acquired beliefs that are inconsistent with core knowledge intuitions 
(versus acquired beliefs that are consistent with them) should be more dependent on 
executive function resources and therefore differentially influenced by cognitive load. 
 
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
2.1.1. Experiment 1 
Participants were Christian religious adherents recruited from the Psychological & 
Brain Sciences Department Subject Pool at the University of California, Santa Barbara, to 
fulfill course requirements. Participants were prescreened to have grown up with, and 
currently identify with, a Christian religious tradition, and to identify as at least slightly 
religious and slightly spiritual. One participant was excluded for identifying with a non-
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mainstream Christian religious tradition, and three participants were excluded for having 
religion Sentence Verification Task scores at or below 50% (which may be a sign of adhering 
to non-mainstream theological doctrines).42 
The final sample of N = 118 (78% F) had a mean age of 19 (range 18 – 24). 
Participants identified as Hispanic or Latino (46%), White (26%), East, Southeast, or South 
Asian (15%), Black (5%), or as another race or ethnicity (7%). The majority of participants 
identified as Roman Catholic (60%), with the remainder mostly identifying with a variety of 
Protestant religious denominations including 20% who simply identified as “Christian”43. 
Ninety seven percent currently identified with the religious tradition with which they grew up 
(the exception being participants who formerly identified as Roman Catholic and now 
identified as “Christian”). Finally, on a scale of 0 = Not at all to 100 = Very, participants 
identified as M = 64 (SD = 20) on religiosity and M = 67 (SD = 22) on spirituality. 
 
2.1.2. Experiment 2 
Participants were Christian religious adherents recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk and paid $2.00 for their participation. Participants were prescreened using the same 
criteria as in Exp. 1, except for a stricter prescreening of religious identification: only 
Catholics and Protestants were allowed to participate. Participants were assigned to one of 
three cognitive load conditions: Baseline (no response window; n = 37), Slow (1,000 ms per 
                                                 
42 If the scores were equal to or slightly larger than 50% one-sample t-tests were used to confirm that 
they were not statistically different from 50%. This exclusion strategy is conservative in that it assigns equal 
weight to consistent and inconsistent items. 
 
43 In Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (2017), the majority of participants recruited from this subject 
pool who identified as “Christian” reported being affiliated with the local Charismatic church (Evangelical 
Christians usually identify themselves a simply “Christian”); it is quite likely, then, that the majority of these 
participants are Evangelical Christians. 
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word response window; n = 24), and Fast (500 ms per word response window; n = 31). 
(Because of experimenter error, data for the baseline condition were collected after the Slow 
and Fast conditions; participants were assigned to the Slow and Fast conditions randomly.) 
Six participants were excluded for having religion Sentence Verification Task scores at or 
below 50% (3 each in the Slow and Fast conditions), and 2 participants in the Fast condition 
were removed for having 100% time-outs (suggesting that they did not actually take the 
task). 
The final sample of N = 92 (63% F) had a mean age of 43 (range 25 – 81). 
Participants identified as White (76%), Black (12%), Hispanic or Latino (4%), or as another 
race or ethnicity (8%). Participants identified as Roman Catholic (44%), Evangelical (37%), 
or with a variety of non-Evangelical Protestant religious denominations (20%). Eighty eight 
percent currently identified with the religious tradition with which they grew up. Finally, on a 
scale of 0 = Not at all to 100 = Very, participants identified as M = 70 (SD = 21) on 
religiosity and M = 76 (SD = 19) on spirituality. 
 
2.2. Design 
The independent variables are psychology versus physicality statements. The 
dependent variables are interference scores for accuracy and response time. 
 
2.3. Materials 
Statements about the psychological (beliefs and perceptions, each n = 20) and 
physical (n = 20) characteristics of God were constructed in quartets, with each quartet 
concerning a particular theological doctrine (e.g., infallibility, omnipresence, or 
129 
 
incorporeality). In each quartet there was a pair of consistent statements (true according to 
both intuitions about persons and Christian theology about God, or false according to both) 
and a pair of inconsistent statements (true intuitively but false theologically, or false 
intuitively but true theologically). Additionally, statements (n = 64) concerning mathematics 
and science (from Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012) were added as distractors. We do not present 
analyses of this data here. 
Thus, within each quartet there were two true and two false statements according to 
Christian theology. The four statements within each quartet were further balanced in terms of 
overall sentence structure, complexity, and length in words. Compared to our previous 
studies we eased the requirement that the number of words per statement be equal within 
each quartet to instead emphasize conceptual clarity and reading clarity. 
Accuracy and response time interference scores were calculated as the mean 
difference between consistent and inconsistent statements, such that performance on 
consistent statements was a baseline with which performance on inconsistent statements was 
compared. Thus, accuracy and response time interference scores different from zero can be 
interpreted as the presence of response interference, and scores higher than zero can be 
interpreted as worse performance (lower accuracy and higher response time) on inconsistent 
than on consistent statements. 
Lastly, participants took a survey which included demographic questions, indices of 
explicit beliefs about God, a 30-item theological expertise scale constructed with extensive 
feedback from a professor of Religious Studies specializing in the history of Christianity and 
from a Catholic priest, and the 24-item Christian Orthodoxy Scale (Fullerton & Hunsberger, 
1982). We do not present analyses of the TES and COS here. 
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2.4. Procedure 
Participants in Exp. 1 were tested in semi-private computer stations in an 
experimental psychology laboratory, while participants in Exp. 2 were tested online. The 
experiment lasted 20 to 30 minutes. 
Statements were presented one-by-one and in a randomized order (using Inquisit 
software), and responses were collected via key presses; participants were instructed to 
respond with their dominant hand, and whether the index or ring finger was used to respond 
“true” or “false” was randomized between participants. The instructions to the sentence 
verification task emphasized both response accuracy and time. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
All analyses were performed using JASP 0.8.1.2. The data analysis strategy was as 
follows: First, data points that were above or below 3SD from the mean response time of 
each statements were removed (about 2% of data points). Second, response time interference 
scores were calculated using both correct and incorrect responses. Third, for simplicity, only 
analyses on interference scores are reported, however, the findings are the same if consistent 
and inconsistent statements are analyzed separately, that is, without calculating interference 
scores, using a Bayesian repeated-measures Analysis of Variance. 
 
3.1. Experiment 1 
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The full list of items along with accuracy and response time data are displayed in 
Tables 1-2. 
 
 
 
Table 1
Psychology Items Accuracy and Response Time Data.
Subtype Consistency Intuition Theology Item Per Item Per Pair Per Item Per Pair
Beliefs Consistent T T God has true beliefs. 0.91 0.94 1650 1766
F F All God's beliefs are false. 0.96 1882
Inconsistent T F God has false beliefs. 0.91 0.84 1753 1794
F T All God's beliefs are true. 0.78 1835
Beliefs Consistent T T God can know what I want even if I don't tell Him. 0.89 0.93 3551 3829
F F God won't know anything I want even if I tell Him. 0.96 4107
Inconsistent T F God can know everything I want only if I tell Him. 0.73 0.77 3500 3253
F T God knows everything I want even if I don't tell Him. 0.82 3007
Beliefs Consistent T T God and doctors both know about medicine. 0.80 0.89 2697 2701
F F Neither God nor doctors know about medicine. 0.98 2706
Inconsistent T F Doctors know more about medicine than God. 0.70 0.66 2814 2748
F T God knows more about medicine than doctors. 0.61 2681
Beliefs Consistent T T God can know where people were born. 0.96 0.95 2136 2083
F F God doesn't know where anyone was born. 0.94 2030
Inconsistent T F God only knows where some people were born. 0.91 0.91 2420 2144
F T God knows where everyone was born. 0.91 1869
Beliefs Consistent T T God knows about past events. 0.98 0.99 1481 1869
F F God doesn't know about any past events. 1.00 2258
Inconsistent T F God only knows about some past events. 0.94 0.94 2078 1983
F T God knows about all past events. 0.95 1887
Perceptions Consistent T T God can sometimes see what I'm doing. 0.69 0.83 2072 2002
F F God can never see what I'm doing. 0.96 1931
Inconsistent T F Sometimes God can't see what I'm doing. 0.98 0.98 1989 1854
F T God can always see what I'm doing. 0.98 1720
Perceptions Consistent T T God can sometimes hear what I'm saying. 0.73 0.85 2222 2134
F F God can never hear what I'm saying. 0.96 2046
Inconsistent T F Sometimes God can't hear what I'm saying. 0.95 0.93 2148 2015
F T God can always hear what I'm saying. 0.91 1881
Perceptions Consistent T T God can listen to people's prayers. 0.95 0.95 1766 1886
F F God can't listen to people's prayers. 0.96 2005
Inconsistent T F God listens to people's prayers one at a time. 0.51 0.71 3044 2798
F T God listens to all people's prayers at once. 0.91 2553
Perceptions Consistent T T At any given moment God can see what people are doing. 0.93 0.95 2678 2938
F F At any given moment God cannot see what anyone is doing. 0.96 3198
Inconsistent T F At any given moment God only sees what some people are doing. 0.80 0.89 3257 2885
F T At any given moment God sees what everyone is doing. 0.98 2513
Perceptions Consistent T T On any given day God can listen to people's prayers. 0.98 0.95 2803 3181
F F On any given day God cannot listen to anyone's prayers. 0.91 3558
Inconsistent T F In a single day God only listens to some people's prayers. 0.85 0.90 2903 2730
F T In a single day God listens to everyone's prayers. 0.95 2557
Mean Accuracy (%) Mean RT (ms)
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3.1.1. Evidence of response interference from an embodied person concept 
Bayesian one-sample t-tests showed that for physicality items, the hypothesis that 
interference scores are different from zero was 19.95 times more likely than the null for 
accuracy, and > 300 times more likely for response time. The hypothesis that interference 
scores for psychology items are different from zero was supported  for accuracy (𝐵𝐹10 = 
102.27), but not for response time (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.16 or 𝐵𝐹01 = 6.36), thereby only partially 
replicating our past findings on this (Barlev et al., 2017, and Barlev et al., Accepted). See 
Fig. 1 for pirate plots. 
 
Table 2
Physicality Items Accuracy and Response Time Data.
Consistency Intuition Theology Item Per Item Per Pair Per Item Per Pair
Consistent T T God can be at my church and at other churches. 0.96 0.98 2226 2178
F F God is never at my church or at other churches. 1.00 2130
Inconsistent T F God is at my church when He is not at other churches. 0.87 0.93 4051 3600
F T God is at all times at my church and at other churches. 0.98 3149
Consistent T T God can act on different objects at different times. 0.98 0.95 2573 2719
F F God can't act on any object at any time. 0.93 2865
Inconsistent T F God can only act on some objects at a time. 0.82 0.86 3001 2855
F T God can act on all objects at the same time. 0.91 2709
Consistent T T God can be in different places at different times. 0.96 0.97 1741 2267
F F God can't be in any place at any time. 0.98 2794
Inconsistent T F God can only be in one place at a time. 0.98 0.98 2062 2416
F T God can be in every place at the same time. 0.98 2770
Consistent T T God can occupy the physical space next to me. 0.84 0.85 2266 2686
F F God can't occupy the physical space next to me. 0.85 3107
Inconsistent T F God can't occupy the exact physical space that I do. 0.76 0.77 3105 2915
F T God can occupy the exact physical space that I do. 0.78 2725
Consistent T T God can occupy the physical space inside a cloud. 0.73 0.78 2722 3058
F F God can never occupy the physical space inside a cloud. 0.83 3395
Inconsistent T F God can never occupy the physical space inside a boulder. 0.85 0.75 3320 3260
F T God can occupy the physical space inside a boulder. 0.64 3201
Mean Accuracy (%) Mean RT (ms)
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Fig 1. Pirate plots of mean accuracy (%) and response time (s) interference scores on 
psychology and physicality items. The inference bands correspond to the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Additional Bayesian paired-samples t-tests found no difference between accuracy 
interference scores on physicality and psychology items (𝐵𝐹10 = 0.29 or 𝐵𝐹01 = 3.41), but 
physicality items had larger response time interference scores than psychology items (𝐵𝐹10 > 
300). 
 
3.2. Experiment 2 
 
The analyses reported here marked timed-out responses as incorrect; excluding them 
from analysis yields identical results. Additionally, because there were only very few time-
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outs (none in the Slow condition, and 4.60% in the Fast condition), response time data for the 
Slow and Fast conditions is displayed. However, this data should be interpreted with caution 
because the upper limit of this data is artificially truncated. 
 
3.2.1. Evidence of response interference from an embodied person concept 
Bayesian one-sample t-tests showed that for physicality items, the hypothesis that 
response accuracy and time interference scores are different from zero was supported in the 
Baseline and Slow conditions, and partially supported in the Fast condition. In the Baseline 
condition, the experimental hypothesis was 7.69 (accuracy) and > 300 (response time) more 
likely than the null; in the Slow condition it was 9.18 (accuracy) and 13.01 (response time) 
more likely than the null; and in the Fast condition it was 0.46 (accuracy) and 9.90 (response 
time) more likely than the null. 
The hypothesis that interference scores for psychology items are different from zero 
was for the most part not supported. In the Baseline condition, the experimental hypothesis 
was .52 (accuracy) and 0.38 (response time) more likely than the null; in the Slow condition 
it was 0.39 (accuracy) and 0.41 (response time) more likely than the null; and in the Fast 
condition it was 0.46 (accuracy) and 9.90 (response time) more likely than the null. See Fig. 
2. 
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Fig 2. Pirate plots of mean accuracy (%) and response time (s) interference scores on 
psychology and physicality items for the three cognitive load conditions. Baseline (no time 
limit), Slow (1s per word), and Fast (.5s per word). The inference bands correspond to the 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
3.2.2. No evidence that response interference is magnified under cognitive load 
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Bayesian one-way ANOVAs found no support for the hypothesis that accuracy 
interference varied with the cognitive load manipulation (psychology: 𝐵𝐹10 = 1.17; 
physicality: 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.28). The results for response time interference were mixed 
(psychology: 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.20; physicality: 𝐵𝐹10 = 30.50), however, the pattern is the opposite of 
that predicted (lower response time interference in the Fast condition than the Baseline and 
Slow conditions) and is likely due to an artificial truncation of response times by the 
cognitive load manipulation used here. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The primary question the present study aimed to answer was whether the Christian 
God is represented as an embodied rather than a disembodied person (e.g. Bloom, 2005; 
Shtulman & Lindeman, 2016). The method used was a sentence verification task previously 
used by Barlev, Mermelstein, and German (2017; Under Review) to test representations of 
God’s psychology, modified in the present study to additionally test representations of God’s 
physicality. In two samples of Christian religious adherents (recruited via a university 
undergraduate subject pool or Amazon Mechanical Turk), task performance revealed 
evidence of conflict or interference between an acquired Christian theological representation 
of God and an embodied person concept: in Exp. 1 and in the Baseline and Slow conditions 
of Exp. 2 accuracy and response time were worse on statements where theological 
representations of God and an embodied person concept were inconsistent (e.g. “God is at 
my church when He is not at other churches”) than on statements where they were consistent 
(e.g. “God can be at my church and at other churches”). The hypothesis wherein God is 
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represented as a disembodied person predicts no accuracy or response time differences, and 
was therefore not supported. 
However, in contrast to the above findings on (embodied) person concept physicality, 
the present study only partially replicated previous findings of interference between acquired 
Christian theological representations of God and person concept psychology (Barlev et al., 
2017; Under Review). The accuracy findings replicated in Exp. 1 and in the Fast condition of 
Exp. 2, but not in the Baseline and Slow conditions of Exp. 2; the response time findings did 
not replicate in either experiment. Why?  
The psychology statements used in the present study were modified from previous 
studies, and a close examination of the statement-by-statement data (Table 1) reveals a partial 
possible answer: there was an error in the structure of two perceptions statements from two 
separate quartets (though these statements were similarly constructed and the error was 
therefore the same): “God can sometimes see what I’m doing” and “God can sometimes hear 
what I’m saying”. Both statements were coded as true intuitively and true theologically, but 
have unusually low accuracies (in Exp. 1, 69% and 73%, respectively, with similarly low 
accuracies in the three conditions in Exp. 2). The modifier “sometimes” in both may have 
been interpreted as “only sometimes” by some participants, thereby making these participants 
respond “false”. 
When data from these two quartets were excluded, Bayesian one-sample t-tests of 
accuracy interference scores in Exp. 2 showed very strong support for the experimental 
hypothesis (Baseline: 𝐵𝐹10 = 40.52; Slow: 𝐵𝐹10 = 16.89; Fast: 𝐵𝐹10 > 300); response time 
interference scores, however, were still inconclusive or showed weak support for the null 
(Baseline: 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.18; Slow: 𝐵𝐹10 = 0.23; Fast: 𝐵𝐹10 = .034). 
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The secondary question the present study aimed to answer, motivated by the 
theorizing of Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 1996, 1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 
2009) on the meta-representational mechanism and on the related literature on dual-process 
theory (e.g. Mercier & Sperber, 2011), was whether response interference is magnified under 
cognitive load. A comparison of the three cognitive load conditions in Exp. 2 (no cognitive 
load baseline, Slow, and Fast) failed to find evidence in support of this. 
Why did Barlev et al. (2017) find evidence that religion response interference is 
magnified under cognitive load (see Exp. 2) but the present study did not? A comparison of 
the two studies reveals two possibilities. First, Barlev et al. used shorter response windows 
than even the Fast condition in the present study (403ms versus 500ms on average per word). 
Second, rather than the blanket 500ms or 1,000ms per word cut-off used here, Barlev et al. 
calculated cut-offs for each statement based on reading times for that statement (range 289ms 
to 727ms per word). In future, response windows can be calculated in a way more similar to 
that used in Barlev et al., or alternatively, other cognitive load manipulations can be used 
(e.g., see Study 2 in Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015). 
 
4.1. The cognitive optimum theory can explain the historical and cross-cultural ubiquity 
of beliefs in disembodied minds 
A central advantage of the intuitive mind-body dualism hypothesis is in its purported 
ability to explain the historical and cross-cultural ubiquity of beliefs in disembodied beings. 
However, if dualistic intuitions are not attractors around which more elaborated beliefs in 
disembodied beings form, what are? Boyer (1994a,b; 2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) 
proposed that one such attractor is inconsistencies with core knowledge intuitions. 
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The motivation for this is the theorizing of Sperber and colleagues (Sperber, 1985, 
1996, 1997, 2000; Mercier & Sperber, 2009) on the meta-representational mechanism. 
Sperber and colleagues argue that acquired information that is inconsistent with preexisting 
beliefs (stored in an intuitive database of beliefs) is quarantined in a specialized meta-
representational “bubble”. We attend to and remember this information, and are particularly 
motivated to talk about it, because we try to collect additional information so as to reconcile 
it with our preexisting beliefs. In the process of talking about it we transmit it broadly. 
However, if this acquired information is inconsistent with core knowledge intuitions then 
there is no additional information that could reconcile between the two; consequently, the 
meta-represented information cannot be incorporated into the intuitive database of beliefs. 
Thus, for as long as we hold on to this information, we continue transmitting it to others. 
Boyer pointed out that in many religions, the psychology, biology, and/or physicality, 
of extraordinary beings is inconsistent with intuitions about persons (in Christianity, an 
omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and incorporeal God is inconsistent with all three). 
Indeed, while intuitive mind-body dualism suggests that beliefs in disembodied minds are 
ubiquitous because they are a natural way in which the human mind represents intentional 
beings, Boyer’s cognitive optimum theory suggests that these beliefs are ubiquitous because 
they are un-natural. The fact that sentences about God’s physicality elicit speaks against the 
view that God is represented as a disembodied mind; it is, however, compatible with Boyer’s 
view that God is represented as an embodied person, and that acquired Christian theology 
about God is inconsistent with different core knowledge intuitions, including those about 
physicality.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Discussion and future directions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this dissertation was to investigate how the brain builds evolutionarily 
new concepts, and, in the process, bring new data to bear on debates about whether learning 
is caused by domain-general, “blank slate” mechanisms or domain-specialized, content-rich 
ones (sometimes termed core knowledge mechanisms). By the domain-specialized view 
presented here, evolved, content-rich mechanisms scaffold learning within evolutionarily 
relevant domains, such as objects, their spatio-temporal properties, and physical causality 
(naïve physics); animals and plants (naïve biology); persons; mental states and the 
relationship between mental states and behavior (naïve psychology), coalitions (e.g., in-group 
versus out-group, physical formidability, dominance hierarchy, and cheater), and many 
others. 
But how are concepts that were not targets of natural selection built? I argued that 
evolutionarily new concepts are not built out of nothing, as domain-general theories predict, 
but as predicted by the domain-specialized view presented here, out of representations 
embedded in core knowledge mechanisms. The Christian God concept, I argued, is built by 
using the existing person template which is subsequently elaborated to include properties 
attributed to God in Christian theology, including properties inconsistent with the person 
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template that was initially co-opted (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and 
incorporeality). 
The primary question I investigated is whether the Christian God concept continues to 
engage core knowledge intuitions about persons, such that these co-exist with inconsistent 
acquired Christian theological representations, or whether these acquired representations 
disengage from core knowledge intuitions about persons. That is, it is possible that while 
learning evolutionarily new concepts is initially possible only through our repertoire of 
evolved, content-rich mechanisms, the brain also contains domain-general learning 
mechanisms with which we can break the chains of our evolutionary past on our modern 
psychology.   
If the God concept continues to engage core knowledge mechanisms, then the 
representations generated by core knowledge mechanisms and inconsistent acquired 
Christian theological representations may conflict. I hypothesized that, if so, then when 
Christian religious adherents are asked to evaluate statements that activate conflicting 
representations, then these representations may interfere with each other. The co-existence 
hypothesis predicts, therefore, that accuracy and response time will be worse for statements 
that activate core knowledge mechanisms and inconsistent acquired Christian theological 
representations compared to statements that activate consistent acquired representations. 
Alternatively, if acquired representations disengage from core knowledge intuitions about 
persons, then there is no representational conflict – the only representations activated will be 
the acquired ones.  
Past research has shown that science concepts that are inconsistent with core 
knowledge intuitions show response interference as predicted by the representational co-
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existence hypothesis (e.g. Goldberg & Thompson-Schill, 2009; Shtulman & Harrington, 
2016; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012). I argued, however, that these experiments do not 
provide a clean test of the co-existence hypothesis because they confound core knowledge 
intuitions and knowledge acquired through personal experiences. For example, the data about 
objects provided by one’s senses is consistent with the inferences of the core object 
mechanism: for example, core object intuitions say that rocks are made of matter but air is 
not, but science says that both air and rocks are made of matter. What science says conflicts 
with information delivered by the core object mechanism, but what science says also 
conflicts with information delivered by our perceptual systems. Thus, science concepts 
acquired early in development could interfere with later-acquired science concepts for two 
distinct reasons: (1) early-acquired science concepts are based on core knowledge intuitions, 
and these core knowledge intuitions cannot be revised, or (2) learners have personal, 
perceptual experiences that are consistent with the early-acquired science concepts, and 
inconsistent with the later-acquired science concepts. 
In Chapter 1 I argued that studies of how Christian religious adherents represent the 
concept of God are a cleaner test of the co-existence hypothesis. Because knowledge of God 
comes from other people, not from the data of one’s senses, it bypasses the problem of 
personal experience, that is, in this case study core knowledge intuitions and perceptual 
experiences are not confounded. Thus, if the God concept is shown to engage representations 
that conflict with Christian theology about God (e.g. fallibility), then these representations 
must be the operation of core knowledge mechanisms rather than knowledge acquired from 
perceptual experiences. 
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In Chapter 2 I reviewed early findings on representational co-option and co-existence 
(Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998), along with more recent criticisms of them (e.g. 
Shtulman, 2008). I then presented data in support of representational co-option and co-
existence using a novel sentence verification task methodology. Exp. 1-2 showed that 
Christian religious adherents performed worse on inconsistent versus consistent items (lower 
accuracy and higher response time), while Exp. 3 ruled-out an alternative interpretation of 
these findings by showing that there are no differences in performance between items when 
the extraordinary religious entity (God) is replaced with an ordinary one (a priest). The 
findings presented in Chapter 2 additionally cast doubt on the hypothesis by Barrett and 
colleagues that the God concept is based on an omniscient person concept (the preparedness 
hypothesis). In Chapter 3 (Exp. 4) I expanded on the findings of Chapter 2, showing that 
representational co-existence is invariant with age. Thus, core knowledge intuitions of God 
as a person may not be revisable even with many decades of experience with Christian 
theology of God as an omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and incorporeal being. In 
Chapter 5 (Exp. 5-6) I critically evaluated the hypothesis by Bloom and colleagues that 
extraordinary being concepts co-opt a disembodied person concept (this so-called intuitive 
mind-body dualism hypothesis is extensively discussed in Chapter 4). I showed that, as 
hypothesized by Boyer (1994a,b; 2001; also see Barrett & Keil, 1996; Barrett, 1998), the 
God concept co-opts an embodied person concept, not a disembodied person concept. 
 
2. The implications of the representational co-existence hypothesis for theories of 
transmitted culture 
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2.1. Historical and cross-cultural similarities in religious concepts and the cognitive 
optimum hypothesis 
Under a blank slate and domain-general learning view, the set of religious concepts 
which could exist is infinite. In contrast to concepts of perceptible entities like rocks, trees, 
and animals, religious concepts such as extraordinary beings cannot be argued to be built 
from and stabilized by personal experiences. Because of this, there should be no historical 
and cross-cultural similarities between religious concepts except that caused by phylogenetic 
relatedness. However, under a content-rich and domain-specialized learning view of the 
mind, concepts, including non-perceptible ones, should be highly ordered, being scaffolded 
and constrained by core knowledge mechanisms. Indeed, historical and cross-cultural surveys 
of religious concepts find precisely this (Boyer, 1994a,b; 2001). 
In a highly influential hypothesis, Boyer (2001; Boyer & Ramble, 2001) proposed 
that some of this order is due to the higher transmission potential of concepts that are 
minimally counter-intuitive. Boyer argued that concepts that engage a core knowledge 
mechanism while also violating a small number of core knowledge intuitions are attended to 
and remembered more than concepts that violate no core knowledge intuitions (or concepts 
that violate too many). The findings reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 5 support Boyer’s 
cognitive optimum hypothesis because they show that, indeed, the Christian God concept 
contains violations of core knowledge intuitions: acquired Christian theological 
representations of God as omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, and incorporeal do not revise 
the core knowledge intuitions or become reconciled with them. In particular, the strongest 
support for this theory is in Chapter 3, which shows that representational co-existence is 
invariant with theological experience as indexed by age. This suggests that counter-intuitive 
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concepts may maintain their higher transmission potential for as long as they continue 
existing in an individual’s mind. 
 
3. Future directions 
 
The argument advanced in the present dissertation is that concepts that were not 
targets of natural selection are built by co-opting an evolved concept. The present dissertation 
showed that in the minds of Christian religious adherents, the God concept co-opts the 
evolved person concept. A non-mutually exclusive possibility, however, is that a different 
concept is co-opted for at least some Christian religious adherents. Bering (2011) presents the 
cases of two high-functioning Autism Spectrum Disorder scientists (Temple Grandin and 
Edgar Schneider), neither of whom are able to conceptualize of God as an intentional agent. 
However, in the words of Bering, to both “God seems to be a faceless force in the universe 
that is directly responsible for the organization of cosmic structure—arranging matter in an 
orderly fashion, or ‘treating’ entropy—or He’s been reduced to cold, rational scientific logic 
altogether.” What concept might be co-opted here? Relatedly, Cohen (2008) suggests that 
possessing spirits that are believed to be the causes of illness may co-opt the evolved 
pathogen concept; it is further possible that in this and other instances multiple concepts (e.g. 
the person concept and the pathogen concept) are co-opted for building mixed 
representations of possessing spirits – since the present dissertation demonstrated that 
multiple representations can co-exist and even conflict, it seems possible that multiple 
distinct core knowledge representations can be engaged by the same evolutionarily new 
concept. 
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A possible extension of the research presented here is to explore the above 
possibilities, that concepts other than the person concept can be co-opted, for at least some 
people, for building representations of extraordinary beings such as God, or that 
extraordinary beings such as the Holy Spirit co-opt a different concept altogether. The Holy 
Spirit, especially among Catholics and Evangelicals, is described as consubstantial with God, 
that is, of one nature with God. Yet, religious adherents talk about having a personal 
relationship with God or with Jesus (Luhrmann, 2012), but not with the Holy Spirit. Rather, 
the Holy Spirit is talked about as bestowing “fruits” or “gifts” (certain personality traits), or 
as otherwise acting on believers by for example healing them. The prediction here is that if 
the Holy Spirit is not conceptualized as a person, or at least not to the same extent as God, 
accuracy and response time interference scores on a sentence verification task modified by 
replacing the word “God” with “Holy Spirit” will be lower for the Holy Spirit than for God. 
 
4. Conclusion 
What are the broader implications of these findings? The past few decades of research 
in cognitive development have revolutionized our understanding of the ontogeny of concepts 
and more broadly of the evolved design of the mind. In particular, research on language 
development (Pinker, 1994) and on core knowledge mechanisms (e.g. Carey, 1985; 2009), 
made possible by remarkable methodological advances in experimentation on pre-verbal 
infants, have shifted the weight of the evidence away from “blank slate” empiricism (little to 
no evolved mental content, with novel concepts acquired through sensori-motor experience 
and domain-general learning processes) toward moderate to strong nativism (evolved 
concepts and domain-specialized learning mechanisms). 
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Still, the starting point of empiricism—and a fact which nativist theories of human 
psychology must explain—is that we are able to learn concepts radically different from our 
core knowledge intuitions: concepts of very small or very large things like subatomic 
particles or the universe; processes on a very slow timescale (e.g. geological and 
evolutionary processes); abstract mathematics; and extraordinary beings like the Christian 
God. Maybe, then, an empiricist theorist might say, our brain contains domain-general 
learning processes with which we can sever the hold of our evolutionary past on our modern 
psychology. The findings reported here suggest that this is probably not so. 
First, in the case of the Christian God concept, and perhaps in cases of evolutionarily 
new concepts more broadly, the brain builds evolutionarily new concepts by co-opting 
evolved ones. This speaks against blank slate and domain-general learning theories because, 
contrary to the predictions of these theories, it suggests that the brain cannot build 
evolutionarily new concepts out of nothing. Second, while the brain may acquire new 
representations about the evolutionarily new concept, including ones which conflict with the 
co-opted concept (e.g. that God is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresence, and incorporeal), 
the co-opted concept continues to be engaged, such that the inferences it generates co-exist 
alongside the new representations. This further speaks against domain-general learning 
theories because it shows that certain reliably developing representations are not revisable, 
but continue to exist alongside conflicting representation; or put differently, this shows that 
evolutionarily new concepts cannot severe the hold of the concepts initially co-opted to build 
them. 
Dawkins concludes The God Delusion with an optimistic question, which he leaves 
open: “Could we, by training and practice, emancipate ourselves from Middle World, tear off 
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our black burka, and achieve some sort of intuitive – as well as just mathematical – 
understanding of the very small, the very large, and the very fast?” (p. 420). The answer may 
be “no”. What is certain is that the human capacity to learn concepts that were not targets of 
natural selection is highly constrained by ones that were. 
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